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This Article examines the use of primary jurisdiction 
through the lens of institutional economics and the ongoing 
revolution in pre-suit, plaintiff-side testing in mass litigation.  In 
this setting, primary jurisdiction serves a necessary pro-agency 
institutional role.  The ability of plaintiffs’ attorneys to easily 
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generate sophisticated laboratory testing results has allowed 
them to create a quasi-regulatory quality-control regime for 
defendants’ products and extract value from it through enhanced 
settlements.  This offers defendants the burdens of regulation 
without the benefits of uniformity or policymakers with subject-
matter expertise and capacity for public input.  Primary 
jurisdiction enables defendants in mass litigation to move these 
quasi-regulatory actions back to regulatory settings, where the 
potential for efficient quality-control standards increases with 
agency expertise.  Shifting decision-making in testing-based 
actions to agencies then preserves this value from conversion into 
litigation-based transaction costs.  As scientific resolving power 
and the scope of potentially measurable harm evolve, primary 
jurisdiction thus functions as a central balancing mechanism 
allowing corresponding evolution in adjudication. 
 
I. Introduction 
“Something there is that doesn’t love a wall . . . ...” 
~ Robert Frost2 
 
A substantial literature in economics examines the 
tradeoffs of regulation versus litigation.  This literature 
considers, e.g., the rise of the regulatory state,3 differences in the 
regulatory state across countries,4 the role of subversion,5 
 
2  ROBERT FROST, Mending Wall, in THE POETRY OF ROBERT FROST 33 
(1979). 
3  E.g., Edward L. Glaeser & Andrie Shleifer, The Rise of the Regulatory 
State, 41 J. ECON. LIT. 401, 401–02 (2003) (discussing regulation and litigation 
as alternatives to securing property rights and concluding the choice between 
the two depends on controlling subversion of institutions); Sam Peltzman, 
Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. L. & ECON. 211, 221–22 
(1976) (proposing a general economic theory of regulation, including, e.g., the 
role of imperfect information and political affiliation of interest groups). 
4  E.g., Andrei Shleifer, Understanding Regulation, 11 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 
439, 440–42 (2005) (examining central arguments against the regulatory state, 
such as litigation solving problems in imperfect markets and the possibility of 
capture of regulatory officials). 
5  E.g., Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 3, at 401; Jean-Jacques Laffont & 
Jean Tirole, The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of 
Regulatory Capture, 106 Q. J. ECON. 1089, 1089 (1991) (developing an economic 
theory of regulatory capture and finding, e.g., that the greater the 
informational asymmetry between the regulated industry and the regulator, 
the greater the possibility of capture). 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss2/3
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capture,6 trust versus corruption,7 and so forth.8  For ease of 
analysis, the models in this literature assume a “wall” between 
courts and the regulatory state and say little about how these 
interface in practice.  Primary jurisdiction, a central doctrine 
used by courts seeking agency input or action, is unnoticed.9  At 
the same time, a large legal literature examining primary 
jurisdiction exists, yet this literature is sparse on the economic 
structure or justifications of the doctrine.10  This Article offers a 
bridge between these two literatures by examining primary 
jurisdiction in an area where economic thought is particularly 
 
6  Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 3, at 408. 
7  PHILIPPE AGHION, ET AL., Regulation and Distrust, 125 Q. J. ECON. 1015, 
1016 (2010) (finding that government regulation is correlated with trust across 
countries).  
8  See generally W. Kɪᴘ Vɪꜱᴄᴜꜱɪ, Overview, in REGULATION THROUGH 
LITIGATION 2 (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002) (noting regulation is superior to 
litigation in highly technical areas or where litigation concerns an entire 
product line); ANDREI SHLEIFER, Efficient Regulation, in REGULATION VS. 
LITIGATION: PERSPECTIVES FROM ECONOMICS & LAW 27, 29 (Daniel P. Kessler  
ed., 2010) (finding the “case against regulation relies on well-functioning 
courts . . . Insofar as courts resolve disputes cheaply, predictably, and 
impartially, the efficiency case for regulation is difficult to make . . . .But when 
litigation is expensive, unpredictable, or biased, the efficiency case for 
regulation opens up” and that “[i]n short, the case for efficient regulation rests 
on the failures of courts.”). 
9  The type of modeling used to examine regulation in the economics 
literature makes simplifying assumptions about the world, one of which is that 
regulation and litigation are two separate approaches to problem solving, 
without considering the real-world nuance of litigation that invokes regulation, 
regulation that alters in response to litigation, and so on.  See generally infra 
note 15 (discussing additional ways in which courts and agencies interact in 
practice). 
10  These articles generally reference economic concepts such as efficiency 
but only at a very high level, relying on other arguments to attack or defend 
the doctrine.  See, e.g., Diana R. H. Winters, Restoring the Primary Jurisdiction 
Doctrine, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 541, 544 (2017) (arguing that primary jurisdiction 
should be limited to its original context of rate-setting); Abby Cunningham, 
Comment,  Purpose, Prudence, and Path: Reevaluating the Primary 
Jurisdiction Doctrine in Context of Opioid Litigation, 9 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 
ONLINE J. 1, 21 (2017) (noting arguments to limit primary jurisdiction to 
expertise issues but arguing “such a course of action overlooks the important 
goals of uniformity and promotion of a working relationship between court and 
agency”); Diana R. H. Winters, Inappropriate Referral: The Use of Primary 
Jurisdiction in Food-Labeling Litigation, 41 AM. J. L. & MED. 240, 255–56 
(2015) (arguing that primary jurisdiction referrals may be dangerous to “the 
quality and safety of the food supply” may  “interfere[] with agency resource 
allocation” and “diminish[] the benefits of having these cases decided in the 
larger context of consumer protection law by courts well-equipped to handle 
such matters.”). 
3
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instructive: mass actions built off product testing or other pre-
suit statistical evidence.11  Specifically, we show that in an 
institutional framework, primary jurisdiction represents a 
needed response to increased resolving power in pre-suit 
investigation.  Easy access to sophisticated product testing has 
allowed plaintiffs’ attorneys to adopt the role of quasi-regulators, 
using litigation and independent testing to compel quality 
control standards traditionally under the auspice of agency 
rulemaking and enforcement actions.  This quasi-regulatory 
regime enhances settlement values for plaintiffs’ attorneys, 
essentially allowing the lack of agency-based regulation to act as 
a legal subsidy to the bar.12 
Primary jurisdiction is perhaps the central legal doctrine 
allowing defendants to move quasi-regulatory actions back to a 
regulatory space.13  It has been criticized as causing undue 
delay, being amorphous in application, and as properly reserved 
 
11  The mass litigation setting offers plaintiffs and defendants uniquely 
asymmetrical transaction costs and incentives, lending itself particularly well 
to economic insight.  See, e.g., Jeff Lingwall, Isaac Ison & Chris Wray, The 
Imitation Game: Structural Asymmetry in Multidistrict Litigation, 87 MISS. 
L.J. 131, 166 (2018) (discussing application of the Coase Theorem to 
asymmetric information and incentives in multidistrict litigation).  This 
Article considers two strands of economic thought, transaction cost economics, 
which attempts to analyze the frictions inherent in exchange and disputes for 
insights into welfare-enhancing actions, and institutional economics, which 
looks at societal structures from an economic perspective. See also Steven G. 
Medema, The Coase Theorem at Sixty, J. ECON. LIT (forthcoming) (discussing 
transaction cost economics); DOUGLAS W. ALLEN, THE INSTITUTIONAL 
REVOLUTION (2012) (discussing institutional economics in general). 
12  See Pierre Schlag, Coase Minus the Coase Theorem – Some Problems 
with Chicago Transaction Cost Analysis, 99 IOWA L. REV. 175, 221 (2013) (“[I]t 
would be salutary . . .  if whenever there was an inclination to tailor legal 
entitlements to economize on transaction costs, we viewed it as a kind of legal 
subsidy to particular users and uses and ask: Why are we engaged in this 
subsidization?”). Schlag proposes generally a change in vocabulary from 
“economizing on transaction costs” to “subsidization.” Id. (internal citation 
omitted).  
13  Courts may require the agency to have expressed prior interest in the 
matter.  See Astiano v. Hain Celestial Grp., 783 F.3d 753, 761 (2015) (“Common 
sense tells us that even when agency expertise would be helpful, a court should 
not invoke primary jurisdiction when the agency is aware of but has expressed 
no interest in the subject matter of the litigation.”); Viggiano v. Johnson & 
Johnson, No. CV 14-7250-DMG (MRWx), 2016 WL 5110500, at *1 (C.D. Cal. 
June 21, 2016) (“[I]t is inappropriate to apply the primary jurisdiction doctrine 
when an agency is aware of but has expressed no interest in the matter at 
hand.”). 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss2/3
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for only special cases involving rate setting.14  Our argument is 
generally to the contrary.  In the context of testing-based mass 
litigation, primary jurisdiction extends and preserves a long 
history of legal and institutional change in response to 
developments in the hard sciences.15  It serves as a pro-
regulatory balancing mechanism allowing defendants to move 
litigation-based quality control regimes to policymakers who 
have expertise, capacity for public input, and ability to create 
uniform national standards. 
Consider how increased resolving power has created the 
following common scenario in recent mass litigation.16  Often, a 
 
14  See Winters, supra note 10, at 544. 
15  Primary jurisdiction is, of course, not the only method by which courts 
and agencies interface.  For example, another way courts and agencies 
interface is through repeated, or serial, litigation.  See Emily Hammond 
Meazell, Deference and Dialogue in Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 
1722, 1723–24 (2011) (discussing dialogue between courts and agencies 
through serial litigation, in which the findings of court and agencies interplay 
over years of repeated litigation and agency action).  This situation provides 
another opportunity for dialogue that applies in the special circumstances of 
litigation that repeatedly returns to courts after agency action.  A further 
option for dialogue between agencies and courts is when agency action changes 
in response to court interpretation.  See  In re J-H-J-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 563, 564 
(BIA 2015) (“Given the overwhelming circuit court authority in disagreement 
with [a prior case] . . .  on the basis of the plain language of the statute, we will 
now accede to the clear majority view of these nine circuits.”).  This second type 
of dialogue again depends on the special case of repeated appellate-level 
disagreement with prior regulatory decisions.  Finally, the “ordinary remand 
rule” allows courts to remand an issue to an agency.  See Christopher J. 
Walker, The Ordinary Remand Rule and the Judicial Toolbox for Agency 
Dialogue, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1553, 1555–57 (2014) (discussing agency 
remand in the immigration context).  In contrast to these methods, primary 
jurisdiction allows courts to allow parties to seek agency action without 
repeated litigation over the same issue, appellate disagreement, or prior 
contrary agency action being reviewed by courts.  It thus represents a crucial 
starting point for dialogue between courts and agencies. 
16  See Jeff Lingwall, Food Forensics in Class Actions: The Race Between 
Pleading Standards and Technology, 52 TULSA L. REV. 213, 218-23 (2017) 
(describing and categorizing product testing litigation in the food labeling 
context).  Although multiple techniques exist to find adulteration in food, this 
is not to say that policing food adulteration has become a uniformly easy task.  
Particularly in a globalized world, this remains a significant challenge.  See 
Mahnaz Esteki, Jorge Regueiro & Jesus Simal-Gandara, Tackling Fraudsters 
with Global Strategies to Expose Fraud in the Food Chain, 18 COMPREHENSIVE 
REV. IN FOOD SCI. & FOOD SAFETY 425, 427 (2019) (listing multiple modern 
sources of food fraud).  At the same time, technological advances are quickly 
progressing this science.  See, e.g., Tomasz Majchrzak, Wojciech Wojnowski & 
Justyna Płotka-Wasylka, Classification of Polish Wines by Application of 
Ultra-Fast Gas Chromatography, 244 EUR. FOOD RES. & TECH. 1463 (2018) 
5
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plaintiff will purchase a consumer item, presumably under the 
direction of an attorney with a litigation theory on hand, have it 
tested by a laboratory using sophisticated sensing equipment, 
and find the trace presence of an unlabeled substance, such as a 
pesticide.  The level is not one illegal under the current 
regulatory scheme, but is one that potentially contradicts other 
claims on the label, claims which many other potential 
defendants have also made.  The court then faces the task of 
adjudicating the claim, such as deciding whether a reasonable 
person would consider this a harm based on the pleadings, 
whether the court has the expertise to adjudicate based on the 
technicalities of statistical product testing output, what 
constitutes reasonable industry quality control practices, and 
how the court’s decision relates to those made by numerous other 
courts considering similar issues.17 
In this situation, multiple adjudicators within and between 
states face an identical problem: what level of contamination of 
the pesticide, if any, should reasonably be considered in violation 
of label claims?  These adjudicators must answer this question 
while transaction costs and the structure of typical litigation 
make coordinating between cases in the short to medium term 
impossible.18  For example, coordinating between state-level 
adjudicators handling similar claims is difficult, even if some 
particular classes of claims are assembled pre-trial in MDL 
form.  States have widely varying consumer protection laws, 
varying standards for common law claims, and different 
procedural rules for handling the reasonableness of pre-suit 
investigation.19  Judges facing these types of claims have 
 
(using machine learning techniques to classify wine origins); Kristian Pastor, 
Marijana Ačanski & Djura Vujić, Gas Chromatography in Food Authentication, 
in GAS CHROMATOGRAPHY - DERIVATIZATION, SAMPLE PREPARATION, APPLICATION 
(Peter Kusch ed., 2019) (describing, e.g., chromatographic techniques for food 
authentication, including statistical methodology). 
17  See Lingwall, supra note 16, at 227–39 (discussing approaches courts 
might consider when responding to product testing litigation). 
18  In the long-term, it is possible that courts could build a body of 
consistent precedent amounting to de-facto national standards.  For food 
labeling claims at least, this appears difficult due to fundamental 
disagreement between courts on foundational issues such as the scope of 
federal preemption.  
19  See Henry N. Butler & Joshua D. Wright, Are State Consumer 
Protection Acts Really Little-FTC Acts?, 63 FLA. L. REV. 163, 175 (2011) (noting 
differences among state consumer protection laws); Kenneth J. Meier, The 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss2/3
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historically come to widely varying conclusions,20 which means 
either the regulatory scheme becomes a confusing patchwork of 
standards or the most extreme adjudicator sets a de facto 
national standard without input from stakeholders other than 
the parties before their particular court.21 
 
Primary jurisdiction offers a potentially attractive 
alternative in this situation.  When referred to an agency, the 
possibility of collective national action is invoked, avoiding 
patchwork or “race to the bottom” judicial standards for 
satisfying label claims.22  Agency decision making is designed to 
take the views of multiple stakeholders into consideration, 
whether through lobbying or participation in notice-and-
comment rulemaking.23  Although the rulemaking process may 
 
Political Economy of Consumer Protection: An Examination of State 
Legislation, 40 POL. RES. Q. 343, 343 (1987) (examining state-by-state variation 
in consumer protection laws from a political science perspective). 
20  See Lingwall, supra note 16, at 227 (discussing responses by various 
courts to product-testing based pleadings). 
21  Producers facing varying state requirements yet wishing to market 
products nationally must comply with the strictest state standard in order to 
comply with them all.  If three state-level adjudicators set standards of 0.3, 0.2, 
and 0.1 parts per million for the level of contamination of a substance that 
violates a label claim, then producers must enhance quality control standards 
to comply with the 0.1 parts per million standard to avoid liability in each 
location. This is similar to the classic “race to the bottom” problem in state-
level policymaking, except that each judge faced with a regulatory question 
becomes a new potential policymaker. See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel, State 
Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It “To the Bottom”?, 
48 HASTINGS L.J. 217, 280-83 (1997) (describing history of the phrase “race to 
the bottom” in policymaking). 
22  Cf. Edward J. Janger, Predicting When the Uniform Law Process Will 
Fal: Article 9, Capture, and the Race to the Bottom, 83 IOWA L. REV. 569, 578-
80 (1998) (discussing “race to the bottom” problems in enacting uniform state 
legislation). 
23  See Nina A. Mendelson, Rulemaking, Democracy, and Torrents of E-
Mail, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1343, 1343–46 (2011) (summarizing literature on 
the pro-democratic aspects of notice-and-comment rulemaking while offering 
concerns, such as agency discounting of value-laden comments); Cynthia R. 
Farina et al., Rulemaking 2.0, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 395, 402 (2011): 
 
In announcing the final rule, agencies must demonstrate that 
they have actually reviewed the public comments by 
responding to criticisms, discussing alternatives, and 
otherwise acknowledging relevant and substantial 
comments. And federal courts have clearly demonstrated 
their willingness to enforce these obligations. As a result, in 
7
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be dominated by a limited number of large stakeholders, it 
allows those stakeholders to participate in a public process in 
ways which are difficult in litigation.24  Multiple consumer 
groups (potential plaintiffs) and producers (potential 
defendants) can offer input, allowing agency expertise to 
consider these views in creating standards for label claims.25  
While this is perhaps an idealized version of the regulatory 
process, the process is designed, and has the capacity, to allow 
input from multiple stakeholders.26  Other than the possibility 
of amicus briefs, litigation generally allows the input of the 
parties alone, unless producer-defendants coordinate litigation 
strategies.27  In this way, referral to an agency allows many 
potential plaintiffs and defendants to contribute when creating 
national standards, something the structure of litigation and its 
inherent transaction costs otherwise prohibit.28 
 
terms of its formal legal structure, rulemaking is probably 
the most transparent and participatory decision-making 
process used in any branch of the federal government. 
  
24  See, e.g., Farina, supra note 23, at  402 n.30; Cary Coglianese, Citizen 
Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and Future, 55 DUKE  L.J. 943, 951 
(2006) (noting empirical findings on domination of the rule-making process by 
industry, including the number and sophistication of comments).  In litigation, the 
use of amicus briefs offers the same opportunity for multiple parties to weigh in 
on a dispute, but heavy use of amicus briefs is typically limited to jurisdiction of 
appellate courts. 
25  See, e.g., U.S. Food & Drug Admin., THE DECLARATION OF ADDED 
SUGARS ON HONEY, MAPLE SYRUP, & CERTAIN CRANBERRY PRODUCTS: 
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: DRAFT GUIDANCE (2018) (noting FDA has “heard 
concerns regarding the declaration of added sugars” and that it “received 
comments from . . .  industry” about a variety of related aspects of the rule). 
26  See Tran v. Sioux Honey Ass’n Coop., No. 8:17-cv-00110-JLS-SS, 2017 
WL 5587276, at *1, *3 (C.D. Calif. Oct. 11, 2017) (noting that “[n]ot only does 
the FDA have experience defining such terms for food labeling . . . but it has the 
capacity to gather facts and comments from the wider public to help define the 
term.”). 
27  See Paul M. Collins, Jr., Lobbyists Before the U.S. Supreme Court: 
Investigating the Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs, 60 POL. RES. Q. 55, 65 (2007) 
(finding that amicus briefing empirically results in shaping the Supreme Court’s 
policy output). 
28  Then, just as settlements may help provide clarity to future litigants and 
deter bad behavior, so does regulatory guidance. “[W]ithout the involvement of 
an expert government agency in the course of litigation, the risk of erroneous 
decisions in private actions may increase, as courts must decide difficult issues 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss2/3
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As part of its capacity to generate multi-party input, 
primary jurisdiction acts as a regulatory counterweight to the 
imposition of plaintiff-created quality control standards based 
on analytical results.29  Imposing quality control standards on 
minute food adulteration or contamination has traditionally 
occurred through a regulatory enforcement process, not through 
ad hoc litigation.30  This regulatory process was the result of the 
input of multiple interest and political groups, and imposed 
quality control standards as the outcome of a non-litigation 
process.  The reordering of analytical quality control to plaintiffs’ 
use of independent laboratory testing and resulting litigation 
represents an enormous institutional shift, particularly as 
plaintiffs’ attorneys are able to yield testing results together 
with the threat of class action litigation to drive up settlement 
values and capture the value of this quasi-regulatory regime in 
the form of higher attorneys’ fees.  For these reasons, primary 
jurisdiction for small claims in mass actions, and testing-based 
claims in particular, gives efficiency-enhancing institutional 
flexibility in the face of increased measurement power by 
plaintiffs in pre-suit investigation. 
 
without the benefit of an administrative record or the agency’s expert opinion.” 
Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement, The Case For 
Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 116 (2007) 
(citing Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Agency Authority to Define the Scope of Private 
Rights of Action, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1996); Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. 
Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1293 
(1982)). 
29  In our analysis, the analytical quality-control aspect of these cases sets 
them apart from other garden-variety label claims over which primary jurisdiction 
may be less appropriate.  See Lockwood v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 2d 
1028, 1035 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (finding in labeling case that “this is not a technical 
area in which the FDA has greater technical expertise than the courts—every day 
courts decide whether conduct is misleading.”). 
30  Of course, for larger adulteration that consumers are likely to notice, the 
civil court system provides a variety of frequently used remedies, such as the 
implied warranty of merchantability and so on. See Jean Braucher, An Informal 
Resolution Model of Consumer Product Warranty Law, 1985 WISC. L. REV. 1405, 
1449-1450 (1985) (discussing consumer perception of potential warranty claims). 
Smaller potential harms, perhaps undiscoverable to the ordinary consumer, have 
traditionally been the realm of regulation. See, e.g., infra Section IV(D) 
(discussing this history in the context of food regulation). 
9
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A final aim of this Article is to place this use of primary 
jurisdiction in the long context of social responses to changes in 
the sciences.  Institutions, whether social structures, 
adjudicatory bodies, or legal doctrines, have historically evolved 
in response to technological change.31  In particular, institutions 
evolve as societal ability to measure increases, such as how the 
ability to measure an individual’s DNA has changed criminal 
law.32  By providing a path for dialogue between courts and 
regulators at early stages of testing-based litigation, primary 
jurisdiction allows interplay and evolution in adjudication in 
response to technological change in measurement power.  As 
scientific resolving power pushes the limits of measurement 
forward, allowing creation of extractive, private, quality-control 
regimes, restricting flexibility in adjudication would be an 
institutional step backwards, cutting off litigation-based access 
to counterbalancing regulatory processes.33 
The following sections first provide background 
information on institutional evolution in response to changes to 
 
31  E.g., Cristiano Antonelli, Localized Technological Change and the 
Evolution of Standards as Economic Institutions, 6 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 195 
(1994). 
32  Both inside and outside of the courtroom, advancements in DNA 
technology have radically altered the ways in which law enforcement procedures 
are conducted.  Improvements that have been made during the past quarter 
century, in particular, have changed the playing field for making and overturning 
criminal convictions.  Today’s popular American crime scene investigation shows 
frequently depict law enforcement personnel running DNA evidence through 
powerful computers to settle cold or seemingly impossible cases.  This is not 
necessarily far from the truth, provided that acquired samples remain 
uncompromised and are utilized in a sufficiently timely manner.  Given ideal 
circumstances, and preferably with additional pieces of evidence or eyewitness 
testimony, modern DNA technology can lead to a rapid and potent conviction (or 
to the overturning of a wrongful conviction).  In cases where DNA evidence is 
incomplete or has been notably tainted in some way, the value of the DNA for 
usage as court evidence lessens drastically. Michael Bobelian, DNA’s Dirty Little 
Secret: A Forensic Tool Renowned for Exonerating the Innocent May Actually Be 
Putting Them in Prison, WASH. MONTHLY (Mar. 1, 2010) 
https://washingtonmonthly.com/2010/03/01/dnas-dirty-little-secret-2/. 
33  This is not to say that parties cannot attempt to influence the regulatory 
process outside litigation. Litigation does not preclude standard lobbying 
channels.  Yet, even if actively lobbying for rulemaking, defendants may still find 
value in moving to stay or dismiss ongoing litigation through primary jurisdiction 
referrals. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss2/3
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measure and then discuss the evolution of the primary 
jurisdiction doctrine over time.  The fourth section examines 
primary jurisdiction as institutional evolution, examining the 
economic structure of primary jurisdiction through the lens of 
transaction costs and institutional economics.  It also considers 
the counterargument that primary jurisdiction referrals 
essentially are transaction costs.  The conclusion returns to the 
analogy by Frost: limiting the primary jurisdiction doctrine risks 
“walling out” statistical-based claims from agencies, preserving 
the creation of extractive quality-control regimes through 
litigation.34 
 
II.   Scientific Resolving Power and Institutional Revolutions 
 
A.   Measurement Revolutions 
 
One major theme of legal and economic history is that 
institutions evolve in response to our ability to measure. For 
example, meritocracy as a method of selecting one’s agents can 
only exist when it is possible to measure merit.35  As many 
outcomes depend on both individual effort and randomness, the 
ability to measure when results are due to effort, rather than 
chance, is critical for institutions.  Many historical institutions 
that we find perplexing, quaint, or antiquated often existed to 
solve problems with measuring outcomes.  For instance, the 
existence of aristocracy might be explained by the need for the 
Crown to resolve trust issues relating to measurement problems.  
In a pre-industrialized era in which the natural world played an 
enormous role in the variability of outcomes (from storms 
disrupting shipping to messengers’ horses laming), the 
aristocracy served as a social condition “designed to allow the 
 
34  Frost, supra note 2. 
35  ALLEN, supra note 11, at 4 (“Ours is a society based on a concept of merit, 
and those who work hard and produce much expect to be rewarded. The race may 
not always be to the swift, but the laborer is worthy of his hire, and we believe 
that, with effort and a little luck, anyone can reach the top of the social ladder.”).  
See DANIEL MARKOVITS, THE MERITOCRACY TRAP: HOW AMERICA’S 
FOUNDATIONAL MYTH FEEDS INEQUALITY, DISMANTLES THE MIDDLE CLASS, 
AND DEVOURS THE ELITE xii-xiv (2019) (discussing a counterpoint to merits of 
meritocracy and how meritocracy preserves social divides and results in miserable 
lives for the “winners” of the meritocratic system). 
11
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members to credibly commit to being honest in their dealings 
with the Crown and each other.”36  The aristocracy’s land served 
as a kind of illiquid “hostage capital” insuring against difficult-
to-measure bad behavior as the nobility carried out the wishes 
of the monarch.37  The need for powerful aristocracy declined as: 
 
increased standardization, brought about by the 
many innovations of the Industrial Revolution, 
caused a significant fall in the variance of 
production outcomes. This fall in variance allowed 
workers to be monitored directly through 
observation, measurement of hours, or 
performance . . . These effects were felt deeply in 
the offices of state. By 1871, the civil service began 
staffing based on exam performance, professional 
standards, and input monitoring which were too 
costly before the age of detailed measurement . . . 
As a result, the role of trust as the foundational 
building block of public service was eroded. The 
removal of trust as the basis of appointment 
meant that the social institution designed to 
generate that trust was no longer needed.38 
 
Similar stories can be told across social history in a variety of 
circumstances.  For example, consider dueling, private 
lighthouses, and public policing.  Dueling by aristocrats was a 
natural extension of the need to be trusted—one’s Honor meant 
one was trustworthy in an environment in which it is difficult to 
measure trust.39  Private lighthouse provision declined as ships 
were able to measure their locations more precisely and no 
longer needed lighthouses as guides.40  A public policing system 
emerged as measurement capability increased and industrial 
 
36  ALLEN, supra note 11, at 56.  
37  Id., at 57 (“The threat of punishment was effective in binding the interests 
between the Crown and its servants, most notable the aristocrats . . . Aristocrats 
converted much of their wealth into forms that were costly to convert back, or, 
more likely, became worthless if they fell out of favor.”). 
38  Id. at 77. 
39  Id. at 81. 
40  Id. at 178. 
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processes became more precise, creating standardized goods 
which made it inefficient for victims to prosecute theft.41 
B.    Institutions and Jurisprudence 
The influence of measurement error on historical 
institutions is closely tied to its influence on modern 
jurisprudence.  Courts have difficulty awarding damages they 
cannot measure.  This basic point pervades the law, from the 
doctrine of standing,42 to the limits of remedies in contract law,43 
to the appropriate scope of tort law.44  It also links law 
 
41  Id.at 197-99. 
42  Without an ability to at least theoretically measure harm, finding an 
injury-in-fact or a redressable problem is problematic.  This is tied to the idea of 
a “concrete” injury and whether an injury is too “attenuated” for standing 
purposes.  See, e.g., United States v. Perry, 360 F.3d 519, 531 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(“Standing measures the distance between the Intervenor’s demand and the 
problem’s source.”) (emphasis added).  See generally Hutton v. Nat’l Bd. of 
Exam’rs in Optometry, Inc., 892 F.3d 613, 618–19 (4th Cir. 2018); In re Sony 
Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litigation, 903 F. Supp. 2d 942, 
955 (S.D. Cal. 2012); Gulf Restoration Network, Inc. v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries, 
Serv., 730 F. Supp. 2d 157, 165 (D.D.C. 2010) .  
43  If a court has no basis of calculating the benefit of one’s bargain, it cannot 
award the benefit. For example, this is the basis of the foreseeability condition 
precedent to expectation damages.  Two classic cases are Rombola v. Cosindas, 
351 Mass. 382, 385-86 (1966) (court awarded expectation damages to party 
aggrieved by loss of race horse based on the ability to calculate probable damages 
from past winnings) and Freund v. Wash. Square Press, 34 N.Y.2d 379, 381 
(1974) (court declined to award expectation damages based on no prior publishing 
history of plaintiff).  See DANIEL MARKOVITS, CONTRACT LAW AND LEGAL 
METHODS 41 (2014). 
44  Tort law is defined generally as a set of civil remedies for wrongs, or 
injuries.  E.g., JENNY STEELE, TORT LAW: TEXT, CASES, & MATERIALS 3 (2017) 
(defining torts generally). Generally speaking, the notion of justly redressing a 
wrong entails that the amount of the wrong be susceptible to measurement. 
Logically, if one cannot measure the harm, one cannot offer a fitting remedy. 
Special cases like trespass to land are the exception—the act of trespass is viewed 
as sufficiently egregious that actual damages need not be alleged to make a prima 
facie case for the tort.  Plaintiff’s attorneys have great incentive to move tort law 
more towards the latter case. For example, medical monitoring torts attempt to 
shirk these two standards by allowing purportedly measurable damages for the 
mere prospect of injury, and are thus controversial.  See, e.g., Victor E. Schwartz 
& Cary Silverman, The Rise of “Empty Suit” Litigation: Where Should Tort Law 
13
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inextricably with the sciences: law is not a discipline with 
expertise in measurement, and so both hard and social sciences 
have their days in court.45  Yet, even for a relationship made 
amicable by consulting fees, this interdisciplinary alliance is 
unsteady—the scope of what can potentially be measured is 
constantly moving, the expertise required to perform and 
understand those measurements changes, and law often finds 
itself playing catch-up.46  The overlap between what the sciences 
make possible and what courts find reliable evolves.  The result 
is a steady stream of decisions forming the cutting edge of 
modern litigation. 
For example, consider the effect of two related, refined 
types of measurements on litigation, first from the perspective 
of physical science and then from social science: the use of 
modern laboratory equipment to measure food labeling claims in 
consumer class actions and the rise of sophisticated economic 
modeling to measure indirect harms in a variety of litigation 
settings.47  For food labeling claims, scientific advancements 
have opened an enormous range of testing for food 
adulteration.48 These include molecular techniques, 
 
Draw the Line?, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 599, 601 (2014) quoting a plaintiff’s attorney 
as noting: 
 
If there were liability for every physical injury or actual 
economic harm that occurs in America, I still would be limited 
in my practice. There are only so many injuries. But if I were 
allowed to recover damages and attorneys’ fees when there is 
no injury, my potential return is unlimited. 
 
45  Of course, one might call law itself a social science, which is debatable.  
E.g., Geoffrey Samuel, Is Law Really a Social Science? A View from Comparative 
Law, 67 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 288, 288 (2008) (noting the answer is “an ambiguous 
one.”). 
46  See Lingwall, supra note 16 (discussing analysis along these lines in the 
class action setting). 
47  See Lingwall, supra note 16, at 218–23 (discussing further history and 
classification of plaintiff-side testing claims for food labeling). 
48  These include many historical advances detailed in infra Section IV, but 
also advancements in relatively recent years.  See MODERN TECHNIQUES FOR 
FOOD AUTHENTICATION xxi (Da-Wen Sun ed., 2nd ed. 2018) (noting that since 
2008, “imaging spectrometry has rapidly emerged as and matured into a powerful 
and fastest growing nondestructive tool for food authentication.”).  
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chromatography, isotopic analysis, vibrational techniques, 
elemental techniques, nuclear magnetic resonance, sensory 
methods, and non-chromatographic mass spectrometry.49  
Combined with easy access to laboratories willing to perform 
these tests, this advent of widespread food testing by consumer 
advocates has caused a revolution in consumer class actions.50 
As illustrated in the introduction, a frequent strategy is to center 
litigation on laboratory test results of the plaintiff’s product or 
on reports of testing done on a product the plaintiff did not 
purchase.51 This laboratory result then becomes the basis of the 
complaint, flipping the script on traditional information 
asymmetries in litigation. The test results become a powerful 
bargaining chip to induce higher settlement values, as the 
 
49  Georgios P. Danezis & Constantinos A. Georgiou, Food Authentication 
by the Numbers, in FOOD AUTHENTICATION: MANGAGEMENT, ANALYSIS, & 
REGULATION 19, 21 (Contantinos A. Georgiou & Georgios P. Danezis, eds., 
2017); see also Esteki, Regueiro & Simal-Gandara, supra note 16, at 430–31 
(listing methods to test specific types of foods); D. Banerjee, S. Chowdhary, S. 
Chakraborty & R. Bhattacharyya, Recent Advances in Detection of Food 
Adulteration, in FOOD SAFETY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: A PUBLIC HEALTH 
PERSPECTIVE 129, 139-41 (Rajul Kumar Gupta, Puja Dudeja & Amarjeet Singh 
Minhas, eds., 2017). 
50  As late as 2000, one author noted of food adulteration that “at the bottom 
line, no one wants to test. It is amazing that the marketplace is as fair as it is.” 
E.C. WILHELMSEN, Adulteration Determination, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
ANALYTICAL CHEMISTRY 3862-3888 (R.A. Meyers ed., 2000). See FREDERICK 
ACCUM, A TREATISE ON ADULTERATIONS OF FOOD, AND CULINARY POISONS, 
EXHIBITING THE FRAUDULENT SOPHISTICATIONS OF BREAD, BEER, WINE, 
SPIRITUOUS LIQUORS, TEA, COFFEE, CREAM, CONFECTIONARY, VINEGAR, 
MUSTARD, PEPPER, CHEESE, OLIVE OIL, PICKLES, AND OTHER ARTICLES 
EMPLOYED IN DOMESTIC ECONOMY AND METHODS OF DETECTING THEM (1820) 
(discussing further history and classification of plaintiff-side testing claims for 
food labeling). As might be expected, Accum’s scholarship has not aged well. 
See, e.g., JAMES SUMNER, Retailing Scandal: The Disappearance of Friedrich 
Accum, in (RE)CREATING SCIENCE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN 32 
(Amanda Mordavsky Caleb, ed., 2007); P.J. Atkins, Social History of the Science 
of Food Analysis and the Control of Adulteration, in THE HANDBOOK OF FOOD 
RESEARCH 97–108 (A. Murcott, W. Belasco & P. Jackson, eds., 2013).  
51  See, e.g., Lingwall, supra note 16, at 214–25 (describing plaintiff-side 
testing in litigation over octopus, parmesan cheese, vitamins, tea, protein powder, 
oatmeal, and so on). 
15
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plaintiff brings quantitative evidence (or at least the veneer of 
quantitative evidence) to the table.52 
Courts confronted by product testing-based claims face a 
difficult analysis. While the tests sometimes reveal substantive 
problems with a product or “food fraud” as this literature might 
term it, such as DNA testing revealing the substitution of one 
ingredient for another, often the test reveals a minute harm.53 
This harm may be within the tolerances set by FDA regulations 
for food generally, but potentially contradicts a label claim. An 
example of this is the stream of litigation over glyphosate in 
products.54  Plaintiffs have tested a wide variety of goods labeled 
as “natural” or “pure” and found the presence of small amounts 
of glyphosate, an artificial pesticide.55 Although within the 
tolerances for pesticides set by regulation, plaintiffs argued that 
its presence in small amounts contradicted the labels.56 These 
actions are often attacked on preemption and reasonableness 
grounds through 12(b)(6) motions, and courts must weigh 
whether they are the proper decision maker to adjudicate how 
much contamination should be considered physically or 
economically harmful. All foods, at the microscopic level at least, 
are contaminated, and imposing liability under a 
 
52 Cf. Sanne H. Knudsen, Adversarial Science, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1503, 1524 
(2015) (“Contingent valuation aides lawyers in leveraging a sizeable settlement 
from defendants, but it does not advance the understanding of harm to the 
ecosystem in any scientific sense.”). 
53  See Complaint at 2, Fonseca v. Goya Foods Inc., No. 5:16-cv-02559-LHK 
(N.D. Cal. May 11, 2016). See also Andreas Schieber, Introduction to Food 
Authentication, in MODERN TECHNIQUES FOR FOOD AUTHENTICATION 1-26 (DA-
WEN SUN ED., 2ND ED. 2018), supra note 49, at 1–3 (discussing the term food 
fraud, including estimates that it occurs in 10% of all commercially sold foods)  
(“There are several terms that have been used to characterize different incidents 
in food, for example, food fraud, food adulteration, food crime, food terrorism, 
food safety, and others . . . Food fraud is the term very often used in the relevant 
literature . . . “). 
54  Glyphosate is a common herbicide first registered for use in the United 
States in 1974. See National Pesticide Information Center, Glyphosate: General 
Fact Sheet, http://npic.orst.edu/factsheets/glyphogen.html (last visited Feb. 21, 
2020). Prolonged exposure to glyphosate may cause a variety of health problems. 
Id. 
55  E.g., In re General Mills Glyphosate Litigation, No. 16-2869, 2017 WL 
2983877, at *1 (D. Minn. July 12, 2017). 
56  E.g., id. 
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reasonableness standard requires someone draw a line between 
contamination no reasonable person would be concerned with 
and contamination a reasonable person would find substantive 
enough to consider having suffered an economic loss. 
Several recent cases illustrate variations on this testing-
based theme. In 2017, the Sioux Honey Association Cooperative 
was sued based on testing of their—ironically named—Sue Bee 
Honey, which revealed the presence of trace amounts of 
glyphosate.57 This allegedly violated label statements noting the 
honey was “100% Pure,” and hence California consumer 
protection law.58 The court considered the complaint, noting that 
the litigation “although ostensibly about the meaning of the 
terms ‘Pure’ or ‘100% Pure,’ is really about what constitutes a 
safe level of glyphosate in honey.”59 It then referred the matter 
to the FDA for potential determination of appropriate levels and 
labeling regarding glyphosate in honey.60 Ultimately, the FDA 
declined to address the matter.61 
In 2019, a consumer advocacy group sued Twinnings North 
America, alleging its Twinnings teas were labeled as “100% 
natural” despite the presence of pesticides. “Tests conducted by 
an independent laboratory using liquid chromatography mass 
spectrometry” showed the presence of low amounts of 
 
57  First Amended Class Action Complaint at36-37, Tran v. Sioux Honey 
Ass’n Coop., No. 8:17–cv–110–JLS–JCGx, 2017 WL 5587276 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 
11, 2017) (No. 8:17-cv-00110-JLS-SS) (C.D. Calif. Apr. 6, 2017). 
58  Id. at  4, 109. 
59  Tran v. Sioux Honey Ass’n Coop., No. 8:17–cv–110–JLS–JCGx, 2017 
WL 5587276 at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2017) (noting that counsel at argument 
distinguished between “bee leg versus biocide” when asked about contamination 
with other substances, and concluding that the plaintiff’s “contention that she was 
misled depends on the harmful nature of glyphosate.”). 
60  Id. at 3 (“For the foregoing reasons, pursuant to 21 C.F.R. § 10.25(c), the 
Court REFERS to the FDA for an administrative determination the question of 
whether and under what circumstances food products containing glyphosate may 
or may not be labeled ‘Pure’ or ‘100% Pure.’ . . . The parties and counsel will 
cooperate in expediting the presentation and explanation of this question to the 
FDA and will notify the Court promptly of any determination by the FDA, 
including any determination not to address the issue.”). 
61  Re: Susan Tran v. Sioux Honey Assn’n, Coop., No. 8:17-cv-00110-JLS-
SS (C.D. Calif. Apr. 10, 2018) (letter from Susan Mayne, Director, Center for 
Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, noting ongoing review of safety by the EPA 
and declining to consider the matter in response to the referral). 
17
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glyphosate, thiacloprid, and bifenthrin.62 Thiacloprid and 
bifenthrin are insecticides that kill insects by disrupting their 
nervous systems, either by direct contact or by ingesting plants 
that absorbed the chemical.63 The FDA classifies these as 
“likely” carcinogens, and so plaintiffs claimed violation of “pure” 
or “natural” labeling statements were material to purchasing 
decisions.64 The consumer group sought declaratory relief, 
injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees.65 
As the final example, a putative class action was filed 
against Whole Foods in 2019, alleging its bottled Starkey water 
contained arsenic despite labeling stating “Protected, Pure, 
Unique” and “Untouched by surface contamination.”66 Arsenic, 
“a metalloid chemical and known carcinogen that can lead to 
reproductive harm, circulatory and nervous system disorders, an 
increased risk of diabetes and hypertension, stomach pain and 
nausea, vomiting and diarrhea, numbness, paralysis, blindness, 
and other health problems,” was tested for arsenic with three 
water samples.67 Consumer Reports found arsenic levels in two 
samples at slightly under the ten parts-per-billion (ppb) federal 
limit, with a third slightly over at 10.1 ppb.68 Based on this 
testing by Consumer Reports, plaintiffs alleged an economic 
loss, having paid more for the product than they otherwise would 
have.69 As with the prior two examples, this became the basis of 
alleged violation of various California consumer protection 
laws.70 
 
62  Complaint at 11-22, Organic Consumers Ass’n v. Twinnings N. Am., No. 
2019-CA-004412-B (D.C. Sup. Ct. July 3, 2019). 
63  Id. at 90–92. 
64  Id. at 93. 
65  Id. at 24. 
66  Class Action Complaint for: 1. Violation of the Unfair Competition Law, 
Bus. and Professions Code s 17200 et seq.; 2. Violation of the Consumers Legal 
Remedies Act, Civil Code s 1750 et seq.; 3. Violations of the Ill. Consumer Fraud 
and Deceptive Bus. Practices Act, 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 501/1, et seq.; and 4. Unjust 
Enrichment at  2, Berke v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., No. 2:19-cv-07471 (C.D. 
Cal. filed Aug. 28, 2019), No. 2:19-cv-07471.   
67  Id. at 2, 4. 
68  Id. at 4. 
69  Id. at 21. 
70  As an additional example not involving low level contamination, 
consumers brought a class action lawsuit against Trader Joes in 2019, alleging the 
company defrauded consumers by charging for excess retained water in their 
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss2/3
2020 LIMITS OF MEASURMENT 103 
Once plaintiffs in these actions have discovered potential 
adulteration, they must tie the adulteration to a legal remedy. 
This connection is premised on the ability to connect 
contamination to a theory of economic loss. In the examples 
considered above involving pesticide presence in food, plaintiffs 
generally have two options to provide an ascertainable loss. 
First, they can claim the products were worthless as sold, which 
should result in a refund of the full purchase price to consumers. 
Courts may be reluctant to consider the product valueless, and 
if so, the economic value lost from the adulteration can be 
difficult to quantify. For example, in a “natural” oatmeal which 
has tested positive for the presence of glyphosate, in theory the 
damages are the price differential between the product labeled 
as “natural” and the product lacking that label statement. 
Unless the defendant has sold two identical versions of the 
oatmeal across markets, charging a higher price for the 
“natural” labelled product, ascertaining the loss due to the 
“natural” statement depends on statistical modeling. 
Fortunately for the plaintiffs in these actions, advances in 
statistics and economic theory have enabled increasingly 
persuasive measurement of a consumer’s loss in these 
situations. As with the hard sciences, the more advanced the 
social science, the greater the potential measurability of harm.71 
Before the advent of economic or statistical theory it would be 
implausible to attempt to measure the economic loss from 
 
chicken—retained water is water left over from processing that remains in 
packaging. Complaint at ¶¶ 39–45, 62–82, Webb v. Trader Joe’s Company, No. 
3:19-cv-01587-CAB-WVG (Sup. Ct. Cal. Cnty. of San Diego, Aug. 23, 2019). 
The plaintiffs used random sampling to test 14 Trader Joe’s chicken products. 
Using an “analytical food laboratory” and a “calibrated legal-for-trade scale in 
accordance with applicable . . . regulations,” the plaintiffs found that Trader Joe’s 
products contained statistically significant more amounts of retained water than 
was advertised. Id. This again allegedly violated various California laws, as when 
class members “pay the marked price per pound” they paid “for excess Retained 
Water.” Id.  at 129–251, 169.  
71  This point has generated controversy within economics, with some 
scholars pushing for increased emphasis on practical significance. E.g., Deirdre 
N. McCloskey & Stephen T. Ziliak, The Standard Error of Regressions, 34 J. 
ECON. LIT. 97, 97 (1996) (arguing that statistical findings “can be permanent . . . 
without being ‘significant’ in other senses, such as for science or policy. And a 
difference can be significant for science or policy and yet be insignificant 
statistically”). 
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minute contamination, and before the advent of econometric 
regression techniques, ascertaining that loss through modeling 
would be difficult to perform. With these techniques, for 
example, if a slate of similar products and their prices can be 
assembled with variation in their label statements, it may be 
possible to identify the effect of “natural” or “pure” on the label 
using cross-product comparisons and statistical assumptions.72 
Although the terminology “resolving power” is typically used in 
the hard-scientific sense, modeling revolutions in social science 
fields may similarly be thought of as increasing the resolving 
power of their disciplines. Together, increased resolving power 
of product testing and increased social-scientific “resolving 
power” mean that plaintiffs can turn minute harms, previously 
the domain of regulatory bodies, into potentially actionable 
litigation. The next section considers the relationship between 
these litigation efforts and potential regulators. 
 
III.     Origins and Background of the Primary Jurisdiction 
Doctrine 
 
A.      Development of the Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine 
 
To consider the effects of advances in the hard and social 
sciences on primary jurisdiction, it is useful to review the 
doctrine’s principles and origins, particularly with the present-
day academic push to limit the doctrine closer to these roots. Put 
simply, primary jurisdiction is a discretionary doctrine which 
helps promote relationships between courts and administrative 
agencies. It was conceived as a mechanism for bypassing 
potential adjudicatory problems by allowing an agency to have 
say when an issue is within the agency’s purview but the case 
itself is still in the jurisdiction of the court.73 Courts can invoke 
 
72  See, e.g., In re ConAgra Foods, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d 919, 944-46 (C.D. 
Cal. Feb. 23, 2015) (working through two separate damages models to ascertain 
a loss from “natural” labeling). 
73  See Winters, supra note 10 exploring the doctrine’s origins, which 
examinesit in modern context, and arguing that  many cases are being referred for 
agency advice without first finding the referral necessary, that this often causes 
needless and harmful delay, and that courts should confine the doctrine to rate-
setting and labor dispute cases, replacing primary jurisdiction advice referral with 
other mechanisms that better facilitate agency participation). 
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the doctrine and thereby stay or dismiss proceedings of a case 
for the purpose of passing their power over to appropriate 
government agencies.74 The doctrinal theory is that under 
certain circumstances, uniformity and consistency can be better 
attained by allowing these agencies, rather than the federal 
courts, to have discretion in a case. This is because acquaintance 
with certain intricate facts is commonly found only among a 
body of experts. Invoking primary jurisdiction can potentially be 
a more efficient course of action rather than courts developing 
expertise or attempting to create uniform national standards 
without national jurisdiction.75 
 
The doctrine has its origins in a few historic twentieth 
century rate-setting incidents.76 One such incident was the 
notable 1907 case Texas & Pacific RR Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil 
Co.77  There, Abilene sued to recover a sum of money that had 
been demanded and coercively collected by Texas & Pacific at a 
rate it alleged to be unjust and unreasonable. At this time, 
shipping rates and schedules were being determined by the 
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). However, Abilene tried 
to bypass the ICC by taking their case straight to federal court. 
The railroad insisted instead that the situation be heard by the 
ICC, stating that the ICC alone had authority and competence 
to determine the reasonableness of the rates under 
consideration. The Supreme Court ultimately agreed, and 
maintained that, even if the matter were indeed cognizable in 
the courts, the ICC should be consulted first, since there were 
 
74  E.g., Viggiano v. Johnson & Johnson, No. CV 14-7250-DMG (MRWx), 
2016 WL 5110500, at *1 (C.D. Cal. June 21, 2016) (“The primary jurisdiction 
doctrine permits courts to stay proceedings or dismiss an action without prejudice 
pending resolution of a matter within the special competence of an administrative 
agency.”). 
75  See Aaron J. Lockwood, The Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine: Competing 
Standards of Appellate Review, 64 Wᴀsʜ. & Lᴇᴇ L. Rᴇᴠ. 707, 735 (2007) 
(discussing efficiency). 
76  See Bryson Santaguida, The Primary Jurisdiction Two-Step, 74 Uɴɪᴠ. 
Cʜɪᴄ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 1517, 1519 (2007). 
77  Texas & Pacific RR Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907) 
(this case is widely agreed to be the start of the primary jurisdiction doctrine, with 
additional, important rate-setting cases following soon after). 
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technical and policy considerations within the agency’s 
particular field of expertise: 
 
the state court was without jurisdiction to 
entertain the cause, and even if such court had 
jurisdiction, it could not, without disregarding the 
act to regulate commerce, grant relief upon the 
basis that the established rate was unreasonable, 
when it had not been found to be so by the 
Interstate Commerce Commission.78 
 
Also mentioned was: 
 
if the power existed in both courts and the 
Commission to originally hear complaints on this 
subject, there might be a divergence between the 
action of the Commission and the decision of a 
court. In other words, the established schedule 
might be found reasonable by the Commission in 
the first instance and unreasonable by a court 
acting originally, and thus a conflict would arise 
which would render the enforcement of the act 
impossible.79 
Abilene laid the groundwork for what would eventually come to 
be known as the primary jurisdiction doctrine. The Supreme 
Court was arriving at the conclusion that having a federal 
agency, such as the Interstate Commerce Commission, handle 
the case would create a nationwide imperative, allowing for 
greater uniformity and unbiased decision making.80 
A few decades later, two additional common-carrier rate-
setting cases helped to solidify parameters and core features of 
the doctrine—Far East Conference v. United States and United 
 
78 Id. at 431.  
79 Id. at 441. 
80  See Richard M. Travis, Primary Jurisdiction: A General Theory and Its 
Application to the Securities Exchange Act, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 926, 932 (1975) 
(“The traditional doctrine called primary jurisdiction . . . rested upon interests of 
‘uniformity’ and ‘expertise’ . . .  Neither policy should be used merely as a vehicle 
to accord uncritical deference to agencies or to substitute judicial judgment for 
that of Congress on the role of regulation in particular industries.”). 
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States v. Western Pacific RR Co. Far East, which took place in 
1952, helped to further organize the doctrine as one which 
promotes the beneficial use of agency expertise.81 The case 
involved the United States filing an antitrust action against a 
conference of maritime freight carriers who had created their 
own dual-rate shipping system. The conference moved for 
dismissal so that the Federal Maritime Board could give the 
dual-rate issues preliminary consideration. When the case found 
its way to the Supreme Court, the Court noted “[t]heir business 
involves questions of an exceptional character, the solution of 
which may call for the exercise of a high degree of expert and 
technical knowledge.”82 The Court then asserted that these 
issues could more straightforwardly be resolved by the Federal 
Maritime Board than by the district court: 
 
in cases raising issues of fact not within the 
conventional experience of judges or cases 
requiring the exercise of administrative 
discretion, agencies created by Congress for 
regulating the subject matter should not be 
passed over.83 
Far East maintained Abilene’s original position of promoting 
comity between courts and agencies. However, it changed 
primary jurisdiction doctrine from being a tool used to discern 
the location of exclusive jurisdiction into one intended to 
facilitate appropriate use of an agency’s specialized knowledge. 
Advancing the doctrine’s fundamentals to concerns beyond 
uniformity made sense to a large degree, non-uniform decisions 
come both because of fractured adjudicative bodies but also 
because those bodies possess differing levels of expertise, and 
thus would not be expected to come to uniform decisions.84 
 
81  See Cunningham, supra note 10, at 2-5 (exploring the doctrine’s origin 
by showing how the twentieth century rate-setting cases created the doctrine’s 
initial core purposes, noting the doctrine lacks clear boundaries, and suggesting 
there should be uncomplicated guidelines for its future usage). 
82  Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 573 (1952). 
83  Id. at 574. 
84  Cf. Great N. Ry. Co. v. Merchants’ Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 291 (1922) 
(“Whenever a rate, rule, or practice is attacked as unreasonable or as unjustly 
discriminatory, there must be preliminary resort to the Commission . . . the 
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Four years later, in 1956, United States v. Western Pacific 
RR Co. helped to further infuse the idea of promotion of working 
relationships between court and agency into the doctrine of 
primary jurisdiction.85 The Western Pacific decision showcases a 
far more modern framework for the doctrine of primary 
jurisdiction and is possibly the doctrine’s most cited opinion.86 
The case once again involved a dispute regarding reasonable 
shipping rates. It also entailed a question about the formal 
definition of an incendiary bomb. In the case, a shipment of 211 
steel bomb canisters full of napalm gel were shipped by three 
railroads for the United States Army. 
The federal government initially paid the railroad 
companies the rate required for incendiary bombs. However, 
because the canisters had no burster chargers or fuses, the 
government afterward contended that they ought only to have 
paid the much lower rate required for gas canisters.87 The Court 
of Claims made an initial ruling which favored the shipping 
companies, but the Supreme Court reversed and remanded it. 
The Supreme Court stated that courts should consult 
administrative agencies when dealing with technical matters 
such as construction of explosives or scheduling of tariff rates.88 
In ever clearer terms, primary jurisdiction was spelled out 
during the case. It: 
 
. . . applies where a claim is originally cognizable 
in the courts, and comes into play whenever 
enforcement of the claim requires the resolution 
of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have 
been placed within the special competence of an 
administrative body; in such a case the judicial 
process is suspended pending referral of such 
issues to the administrative body for its views.89 
 
enquiry is essentially one of fact and of discretion in technical matters; and 
uniformity can be secured only if its determination is left to the Commission.”). 
85  United States v. Western Pacific RR Co., 352 U.S. 59 (1956). 
86  Cunningham, supra note 10, at 13. 
87  Western Pacific RR Co., 352 U.S. at 61. 
88  Id. at 66. 
89  Id. at 64. 
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The Supreme Court recognized the authority the courts have, 
yet it emphasized the need for courts to work in harmony with 
administrative agencies by consulting them for their opinions on 
technical matters such as in defining an incendiary bomb or 
determining appropriate railroad tariff rates.90 
Finally, it is important to note that, in the Western Pacific 
case, the Court made the now famous statement that “[n]o fixed 
formula exists for applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. 
Rather, the proper inquiry is whether the reasons for the 
existence of the doctrine are present and whether the purposes 
it serves will be aided by its application in the particular 
litigation.”91 Like many judge-made legal doctrines, primary 
jurisdiction was left as prudential and without definite 
boundaries, a fact that has invited expansive use by defendants 
and critiques by academics.92 
 
B.      Where the Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine Stands Today 
 
Since its inception through twentieth century rate-setting 
cases, the doctrine has seen widespread and varied usage. Food 
labeling, beyond the testing-based claims discussed above, has 
frequently seen primary jurisdiction arguments.93 Much food 
labeling litigation, including the product testing actions 
considered here, has focused on the unregulated term 
“natural.”94 When the FDA proposed potential regulation for the 
expression, many defendants attempted to invoke the primary 
jurisdiction doctrine to stay their cases pending a decision by the 
FDA. Some successfully reasoned that national uniformity from 
a regulatory agency might be preferable to ad-hoc adjudication 
 
90  Id. at 63. 
91  Id. at 64. 
92  See Cunningham, supra note 10, at 2–5. 
93 See Bradley W. Pratt, The Pathway to Primary Jurisdiction, A.B.A. (Aug. 
10, 2015), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/products-
liability/articles/2015/pathway-to-primary-jurisdiction/. 
94  E.g., George v. Blue Diamond Growers, No. 4:15-CV-962 (CEJ), 2016 
WL 1464644, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 14, 2016); Forsher v. The J.M. Smucker Co., 
No. CV 2015-7180 (RDJ)(MDG), 2016 WL 5678567, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 
2016), Kane v. Chobani, LLC, 645 Fed. Appx. 593, 593 (2016); See generally 
Winters, supra note 10 (criticizing use of primary jurisdiction in food labeling). 
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by courts. For a typical example, In re Kind LLC “Healthy & All 
Natural” Litigation centered around Kind’s alleged deceptive 
marketing practices of their food items, listing as “natural” foods 
that contain “synthetic, chemically synthesized, and highly 
processed ingredients such as soy lecithin, soy protein isolate, 
citrus pectin, glucose syrup, vegetable glycerine, palm kernel oil, 
canola oil, ascorbic acid, vitamin A acetate, D-Alpha tocopheryl 
acetate, and annatto,” and that “[t]esting has detected the 
presence of GMOs” in some Kind products.95 
Primary jurisdiction has also been invoked in the opioid 
epidemic, with defendants invoking the FDA’s oversight on 
prescription drugs.96 In particular, the FDA has been referred to 
concerning opioid narcotics such as Vicodin, morphine, and 
codeine. These mass produced substances contain potent 
chemical agents which replicate the action of endorphins and are 
commonly used as medications for relief of intense pain or 
alleviation of severe depression. Unfortunately, the euphoric 
high achievable through the drugs, coupled with allegations of 
major fraud of product mislabeling and false advertising 
practices by the producing companies, have led to widespread 
misuse, tolerance, addiction, and even death. This has resulted 
in mass litigation, with primary jurisdiction again being used as 
an agency referral method.97 Other areas generating primary 
jurisdiction referrals are labor disagreements applied to the 
National Labor Relations Board, antitrust issues, complicated 
environmental debates, and Medicare and Medicaid disputes 
referred to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.98 
Despite being a popular tool in legal practice from defendants 
seeking stays and dismissals, academics have developed mixed 
feelings about the doctrine, particularly with respect to its use 
as an advice referral method. The central practical argument is 
that these motions can cause a long or even indefinite delay, 
which has potential to add to litigation expenses and harm the 
 
95 In Re: Kind LLC “Healthy and all Natural” Litigation, 387 F. Supp. 3d 
457, 461 (2018). The court stayed the case pending action from the FDA. 
96  See Catherine T. Struve, Greater and Lesser Powers of Tort Reform: The 
Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine and State-Law Claims Concerning FDA-Approved 
Products, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1039, 1039 (2008).  
97  See Cunningham, supra note 10, passim. 
98  See Winters, supra note 10, at 553–54 (cataloguing cases). 
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speedy resolution of disputes.99 The argument goes that in cases 
requiring exclusive agency jurisdiction, having a delay may be 
relevant, since the agency must give a ruling before the case can 
proceed. With an advice referral case, however, the delay is often 
needless, and may be especially damaging if the case presents 
safety issues, such as leaving a product with a misleading label 
with health consequences on shelves. For this reason, some feel 
that the primary jurisdiction doctrine should be re-confined to 
cases involving rate-settings and labor disputes, and that courts 
should make use of other mechanisms to facilitate agency 
participation.100 
An additional, commonly-cited concern is that the doctrine 
seems to lack definite borders or boundaries.101 Even its name, 
primary jurisdiction, can be misleading, since the concept is 
prudential in nature and not necessarily about a district court 
lacking jurisdiction to adjudicate.102 As such, it represents “a bit 
 
99  See Access Telecomms. v Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 137 F.3d 605, 605 
(1998). 
100  We address these questions later, but as an initial note, one solution may 
be for a court to limit the negative effects of a delay by specifically limiting a 
stay’s length. For instance, a court could refer a case to an administrative agency, 
while specifying that if the agency does not make a ruling within a set, reasonable 
amount of time, the court would rescind the referral order and decide the matter 
on its own terms. See, e.g., American Auto. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Massachusetts Dep’t 
of Envtl. Protection, 163 F.3d 74, 75 (1998):  
 
For example, a court might refer a matter to an administrative 
agency, explicitly providing, however, that if the agency fails 
to rule within a reasonable amount of time, the court would 
either vacate the referral order and decide the matter itself, or 
issue an order under 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), which authorizes courts 
to ‘compel agency action . . . unreasonably delayed. (footnotes 
omitted). 
 
101  See Winters, supra note 10, at 241 (characterizing primary jurisdiction 
as an “ill-defined” doctrine). 
102  See Hilary G. Buttrick & Courtney Droms Hath, Pomegranate Juice Can 
Do That? Navigating the Jurisdictional Landscape of Food Health Claim 
Regulation in a Post-Pom Wonderful World, 49 IND. L. REV. 267, 289 (2016) 
(discussing primary jurisdiction together with preemption and preclusion in 
context of food labeling); Jeffrey R. Babbin, Developments in the Second Circuit: 
2001-2002, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1565, 1616–17 (2003) (discussing the difficulty 
inherent in using “jurisdiction” inside the term “primary jurisdiction,” quoting 
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of an enigma in U.S. jurisprudence,”103 where “myths and 
misconceptions abound, and . . . are shared by litigants, lawyers, 
and even judges.”104 Ironically for a doctrine designed to promote 
uniformity, this criticism highlights a lack of uniformity 
amongst courts in the tests or factors to use deciding whether or 
not to apply the doctrine. It has likely been inappropriately 
utilized in many novel or difficult issues without closely 
adhering to one or more of the doctrine’s three original, core 
purposes.105 Finally, primary jurisdiction may damage the 
regulatory process by altering the way agencies prioritize issues, 
and by removing state law benefits from parties.106 
 
IV.     Primary Jurisdiction as Institutional Evolution 
 
This Section considers primary jurisdiction in light of 
institutional evolution and increased scientific ability to 
measure potential harms. The discussion of English peerage, 
duels, and criminal law reform above each illustrated two 
central principles: individuals respond to the incentives they are 
given, and changes in the ability to measure change incentives 
in powerful ways. As the ability to monitor complex public policy 
situations improved, there was less need for a land-based 
peerage system to incentivize proper behavior.107 As trust 
became less of an institutional issue, one’s personal reputation 
for honor became less critical for economic success and dueling 
 
Guido Calabresi as noting the term is “singularly infections” and that “[t]he Holy 
Roman Empire was ‘neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire. . . . It was effective 
nonetheless.’ Similarly, ‘primary jurisdiction’ can be used to denominate what 
should be done in cases of this sort. And, so long as the words are not treated as 
implying what they do not intend, little harm will flow from this terminology.”) 
(quoting MFS Sec. Corp. v. N.Y. Stock Exchange, 277 F.3d 613, 621-22 (2d Cir. 
2002)). 
103  Catherine M. Sharkey, Tort-Agency Partnerships in an Age of 
Preemption, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 359, 384 (2014). 
104  Richard Welch, Demystifying Primary Jurisdiction Referrals, FEDERAL 
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION BLOG (July 29, 2010, 10:00 AM), 
https://www.fcc.gov/news-events/blog/2010/07/29/demystifying-primary-
jurisdiction-referrals. 
105  Id. 
106  See Winters, supra note 10, at 240. 
107  See ALLEN, supra note 11. 
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as means of protecting honor faded, and so on.108 In sum, 
technology changes incentives, and incentives change behavior. 
 
A.  Adjudicators of Testing-Based Quality Control Issues 
 
Just as in these historical situations, as pre-suit resolving 
power in product testing increases, what was previously 
unmeasurable becomes measurable. This changes the incentives 
of litigants.109 As the costs involved in product testing declined, 
both in access to new testing techniques, laboratories, and the 
opportunity cost of attorney time to engage product testing, 
rational plaintiffs’ attorneys turned to testing to drive litigation. 
While the plaintiffs’ bar in food litigation had justifiably earned 
the moniker “the food police” from frustrated defendants, as they 
adopted regulatory-style testing they took on this mantle in a 
fuller sense.110 Now, rather than just bringing actions to enforce 
label claims in the presence of limited FDA enforcement actions, 
attorneys began taking on the role of quality-control regulators. 
What was traditionally a regulatory domain had entered 
litigation. 
Once quality-control testing seeped into the courts, several 
possibilities existed to handle these claims. First, courts could 
deal with these claims “in house” using traditional screening 
doctrines. Twombly and Iqbal allow courts to screen for 
reasonableness under Rule 12(b)(6) motions, so a court can 
examine the complaint in a product testing action and conclude 
 
108  Id.   
109  In particular, the successful use of product-testing in pleadings through 
higher settlements or victories in 12(b)(6) motions encourages other plaintiffs’ 
attorneys to pursue the same strategy. Litigation is generally a competitive 
marketplace, and plaintiffs’ attorneys follow trends in litigation closely. See, e.g., 
John C. Coffee, Jr., Accountability and Competition in Securities Class Actions: 
Why “Exit” Works Better than “Voice”, 30 CARD. L. REV. 407, 407 (2008) (noting 
“[a] sizable literature on class actions has long suggested that the plaintiff’s 
attorney is an independent entrepreneur”). This extends from formal conferences, 
such as the National Trial Lawyers Summit, to sniping legal theories that have 
resulted in success. Product testing begets product testing. For defendants, 
knowing product-testing litigation is possible likely changes their assessments of 
the costs and benefits of labeling decisions.  
110  U.S. CHAMBER: INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, THE FOOD COURT: 
TRENDS IN FOOD AND BEVERAGE CLASS ACTION LITIGATION (2017). 
29
114 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 40.2 
that no reasonable consumer would consider their purchase 
deceptive despite the test results.111 If the complaint is based on 
testing yet fails to disclose the results of the test, or if the 
complaint only alleges that future testing will yield damaging 
results, then defendants can claim that fraud-based claims have 
not been pled with particularity under Rule 8.112 Or, if federal 
law speaks to the testing at issue, it may be possible to construct 
a preemption defense based on regulated quality control 
standards.113 
The disadvantage of these techniques is that policing 
adulteration standards through court decisions leaves a 
patchwork, ad-hoc, and unpredictable environment for 
producers. In this environment, nationally-relevant quality 
control standards are subject to the vagaries of local courts. As 
attorneys working in labeling quickly realize, one court’s 
reasonableness is another’s unreasonableness, and one court’s 
preemption argument is quickly distinguished by another.114 
Although each particular litigation centers on the question of 
whether the reasonable consumers in the state-based class have 
been deceived by a particular product, taken together, multiple 
litigations over nationally-marketed products, centered around 
the same testing-based themes, create ad-hoc policy surrounding 
the testing claims. 
While states may serve as quasi-experimental laboratories 
in many situations, food labeling litigation is generally an 
exception. Labeling litigation generally concerns national-level 
production, as products are marketed nationally to take 
advantage of economies of scale. A negative decision in one state 
then inherently applies across the nation, and the result is not 
that producers create unique state-by-state labels, with quasi-
experimental results giving optimal policy among these labels.115 
 
111  See Lingwall, supra note 16, at 227–39 (discussing the consumer 
protection labeling setting). 
112  See id.  
113  Id.  
114  Compare Reynolds v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 4:14cv381-MW/CAS, 
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53405, at *19–37 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 23, 2015), with 
Stansfield v. Minute Maid Co.,124 F. Supp.3d 1226, 1235-37 (2015) 
(distinguishing Reynolds). 
115  E.g., Craig Volden, States as Policy Laboratories: Emulating Success in 
the Children’s Health Insurance Program, 50 AM. J. OF  POL. SCI. 294, 294–95 
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Instead, producers wishing to avoid liability must follow 
standards set by the most extreme adjudicators, giving 
inordinate power to local courts to create national-level policy. 
This creates a situation in which the parties generate 
externalities well beyond the litigation at hand, and the 
resulting national-level implications created are the result of 
one-off litigation rather than national-level democratic 
processes.116 The resulting policy is likely to please the victor in 
the litigation, but perhaps not be socially optimal. For these 
reasons, as a solution to what is at heart a policy question—what 
level of contamination is acceptable in food with certain claims—
court-based adjudication is wanting.117 
 
(2006) (discussing the diffusion of state-level policies as “successful states’ 
policies were emulated” across the nation). 
116  E.g., Mendelson, supra note 23, at 1343–46. 
117  Due to national-level product markets and the prohibitive costs involved 
in state-specific labeling or state-specific quality control standards, decisions in 
quality-control areas by state-level adjudicators have the practical effect of 
nationwide injunctions. For a critique, see Dep’t of Homeland Security v. New 
York, 589 U.S. __ (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring): 
 
The real problem here is the increasingly common practice of 
trial courts ordering relief that transcends the cases before them. 
Whether framed as injunctions of ‘nationwide,’ ‘universal,’ or 
‘cosmic’ scope, these orders share the same basic flaw—they 
direct how the defendant must act towards persons who are not 
parties to the case. . . As the brief and furious history of the 
regulation before use illustrates, the routine issuance of 
universal injunctions is patently unworkable, sowing chaos for 
litigants, the government, courts, and all those affected by these 
conflicting decisions. . .. [B]oth sides have been forced to rush 
from one preliminary injunction hearing to another, leaping 
from one emergency stay application to the next, each with 
potentially nationwide stakes . . .. And the stakes are 
asymmetric. If a single successful challenge is enough to stay 
the challenged rule, the government’s hope of implementing 
any new policy could face the long odds of a straight sweep, 
parlaying a 94-to-0 win in the district courts into a 12-to-0 
victory in the courts of appeal. A single loss and the policy goes 
on ice . . ..” (emphasis added).  
 
Similarly in the labeling regime, nationwide product markets mean defendants 
must satisfy the most extreme state-level adjudicator to market their products 
nationally. 
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Second, agencies could envelop these claims under new 
regulation. Federal agencies are aware of litigation trends and 
could—at their own impetus—initiate regulation to preempt 
developing issues in the courts. This requires an administration 
willing to take action in the face of ongoing litigation. It also 
takes an administration not under pressure to relieve a 
perceived over-abundance of regulations. Given the wide variety 
of testing-based litigation, policing every type of adulteration 
through new regulation would unleash a large new regulatory 
scope over much of the economy due to the incredible 
sophistication of modern testing techniques and the number of 
issues they can find.118 If de-regulation is the watchword in 
Washington, this is unlikely to occur. 
As a third alternative, increased use of the primary 
jurisdiction doctrine can provide a middle ground. It avoids a 
continual, potentially contradictory series of one-off decisions by 
courts each facing essentially the same question, and it avoids 
extending regulation beyond the reach of what parties find 
worthwhile to litigate.119 
 
B.      Primary Jurisdiction to Adjudicate 
Despite many academic criticisms, including delay and 
failure to preserve Congressional intent for dual-regulatory 
systems, primary jurisdiction may serve as an attractive dispute 
resolution method in this quasi-regulatory context. To show this, 
it is first instructive to break down primary jurisdiction into two 
major motivations for its application. Following von Mehren and 
Trautman’s famed division of “jurisdiction to adjudicate” into 
specific jurisdiction (based on the events at issue in the case)  
and general jurisdiction (based on the presence of the defendant) 
which the Supreme Court adopted through its Daimler and 
Bristol-Meyers Squibb line of cases, it is useful to categorize 
 
118  See, e.g., Danezis & Georgiou, supra note 49, at 21. 
119  Cf., e.g., Linda R. Stanley & Don L. Coursey, Empirical Evidence on the 
Selection Hypothesis and the Decision to Litigate or Settle, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 
145, 147–50 (1990) (modeling law and economics approaches to settling versus 
litigating). Similar analysis encompasses the decision to pursue any form of legal 
remedies for small harms. 
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primary jurisdiction as two aspects: general primary jurisdiction 
and specific primary jurisdiction.120 
In our terminology, general primary jurisdiction denotes 
primary jurisdiction invoked when courts have expertise to 
efficiently adjudicate the matter at hand, but feel agency 
rulemaking or adjudication would be beneficial due to more 
general concerns with uniformity, federalism, dual-regulatory 
schemes, and so on.121 This lies close to the original justification 
for primary jurisdiction in Texas & Pacific Railway Co.122 There, 
the Court worried that “unless all courts reached an identical 
conclusion a uniform standard of rates in the future would be 
impossible, as the standard would fluctuate and vary, dependent 
upon the divergent conclusions reached as to reasonableness by 
the various courts called upon to consider the subject as an 
original question.”123 
In contrast, specific primary jurisdiction denotes primary 
jurisdiction invoked for case-specific reasons, such as by the 
need for specific agency expertise or case-specific efficiency.124 
 
120  Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to 
Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966). The 
Supreme Court essentially adopted von Mehren and Trautman’s analysis in its 
personal jurisdiction cases; Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 (2014) (limiting 
personal jurisdiction); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014) (categorizing 
personal jurisdiction as either specific, general, or non-existent); Bristol-Myers 
Squibb v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017)  (applying Daimler in the mass 
litigation context). 
121  Efficiency may be a concern with general primary jurisdiction, but it is 
efficiency beyond the specific case at hand, such as concerns that non-uniform 
adjudication leads to a risky, unpredictable, and costly legal landscape which 
would be inefficient for parties in general. For example, consider the discussion 
of uniformity in infra note 132 and accompanying text. For a general critique of 
the idea that primary jurisdiction can promote uniformity at all, see Lauren 
Kostman, The Natural Response to Adjudicating Current Litigation When the 
Creation of a Related Agency Rule Is Simultaneously Underway, 41 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 353, 384-85 (2019).  
122  Abilene, 204 U.S. at 431–41. 
123  Id. at 440. 
124  See United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 686 F.3d 832, 838 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012) (noting “the primary jurisdiction doctrine is rooted in part in judicial 
efficiency; if an agency has particular expertise in an area, then invoking the 
primary jurisdiction doctrine could ‘enhance court decision-making and 
efficiency by allowing the court to take advantage of [that] administrative 
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This lies closer to the reasoning Justice Brandeis added to the 
motivations for invoking primary jurisdiction in Great Northern 
Railway Co.125  There, efficiently resolving the dispute required 
understanding “many intricate facts” which would 
“commonly . . . be found only in a body of experts.”126 For 
example, in this usage specific primary jurisdiction was invoked 
in Access Telecommunications v. Southwestern Bell Telephone 
Co. when plaintiffs alleged certain technical violations of federal 
law establishing standards for wiring phone service.127 The 
defendant had filed a schedule of charges for telephone service 
which had been approved by the FCC. The schedule set certain 
transmission standards for, e.g., “attenuation distortion, echo 
control, impulse noise, and phase jitter.”128 Defendant had 
established a 6,000 foot limit for using certain types of wire, due 
to problems with meeting transmission standards, while 
plaintiffs argued this violated the terms of the approved rate 
schedule, and hence federal law.129 The court reasoned that (1) 
reasonableness of a rate was within the statutory authority of 
the FCC, and (2) the “FCC has far more expertise than the courts 
on matters such as circuit designs, signal transmissions, noise 
attenuation, and echo return loss. Thus, the need to draw upon 
the FCC’s expertise and experience is present here.”130 
 
expertise.’”) (quoting Chabner v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 225 F.3d 1042, 
1051 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
125  Great N. Ry. Co. v. Merchants’ Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285 (1922). 
126  Id. at 291. 
127  Access Telecommunications v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 137 F.3d 605 (8th Cir. 
1997). 
128  Id. at 607. 
129  Id. at 608. 
130  Id. at 609. See Tran v. Sioux Honey Ass’n Coop., No. 8:17-cv-00110-
JLS-SS, 2017 WL 5587276, at *1 (C.D. Calif. Oct. 11, 2017)  (referring to the 
FDA for an “opportunity to bring its expertise to bear on appropriate tolerance 
levels for glyphosate in honey and on labeling requirements regarding the same,” 
“the EPA and FDA have the requisite expertise to evaluate this research and 
determine what levels of glyphosate in honey can be considered ‘safe’ and 
whether consumers should be informed of its presence through labeling,” and that 
“[n]ot only does the FDA have experience defining such terms for food 
labeling . . . but it has the re to gather facts and comments from the wider public 
to help define the term”); See generally Chabner v. United of Omaha Life Ins. 
Co.. 225 F.3d 1042, 1051 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that “efficiency” and “expertise” 
would not be enhanced with a primary jurisdiction referral, because the court had 
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The concepts of specific and general primary jurisdiction 
are related. Highly technical matters risk being misunderstood 
by non-specialists, and so uniformity is more likely to occur 
when issued from a central body of experts. For example, in 
finding the need for primary jurisdiction in the antitrust case 
Far East Conference v. United States, the Court first appealed 
to expertise. It noted that facts “generally unfamiliar to a 
judicial tribunal, but well understood by an administrative body 
especially trained and experienced in . . . intricate and technical 
facts” was “better equipped than courts by specialization” to 
resolve the case.131 Then in the same breath, the court noted 
“[u]niformity and consistency in the regulation of business . . . 
are secured.”132 In other words, a lack of judicial expertise risks 
lack of uniformity. 
 
C.   Resolving Power, Efficiency, and Transaction Costs in 
Adjudication 
 
With this framework for primary jurisdiction, consider the 
effect of increased scientific resolving power on the institutional 
relationship between courts and agencies. This Section considers 
this relationship in light of transaction costs, how scientific 
change alters those transaction costs, how altered transaction 
costs change the incentives of litigants, and how those altered 
incentives play out in light of institutional frameworks. 
In a Coasean analysis, it can be instructive to first consider 
a simplified version of the world without many of the transaction 
costs that apply in practice.133 In this simplified world, first 
 
already decided a key factual issue, and then noting that because of the “extremely 
rare” facts at hand, “there would have been little uniformity to gain by referring” 
the matter to an agency). 
131  Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 573–75 (1952). 
132  Id. at 574. 
133  The literature on the Coase theorem is perhaps the largest in all of social 
science. See Steven G. Medema, 1966 And All That: Codification, Consolidation, 
Creep, and Controversy in the Early History of the Coase Theorem, 36 J. ECON. 
THOUGHT 271, 273-75 (2014) (discussing how the Coase Theorem was “codified” 
into economic thought through the efforts of George Stigler). See also Lee Anne 
Fennel, The Problem of Resource Access, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1471, 1472 (2013) 
(“In The Problem of Social Cost, Ronald Coase firmly installed transaction costs 
at the center of the economic analysis of law. The potential for these costs to 
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consider how the parties would react to the creation of a rule 
governing testing claims, and then consider the process by which 
the rule could be created. If litigation, regulation, and 
alternative dispute resolution were frictionless, then whether 
courts or agencies were tasked with establishing rules for 
testing-based claims would be immaterial. Indeed, the rules 
themselves would be immaterial. In such a world, parties would 
costlessly gather and share all the information relevant to their 
position on a label, and potential plaintiffs and defendants would 
bargain to efficient outcomes regardless of the rule established. 
For example, in our food labeling situation, suppose society 
wished to establish the limit for when label statements such as 
“Real,” “Natural,” or “Simple” were violated by contamination 
with artificial substances.134 There is a trade-off between the 
societal value of the descriptor (aiding consumers in purchasing 
decisions) and the costs of complying with the standards of the 
rule (producer supply chain monitoring, production-line quality 
control, and so on).135 Suppose further that the societally 
efficient rule, that is, the one that maximized the sum of the 
welfare of all consumers and producers, was ten parts per 
billion.136 A less strict standard would decrease the value added 
 
inconveniently interpose themselves between the world as we know it and an idea 
of perfect efficiency has provided generations of law and economics scholars with 
an analytic North Star.”). 
134  See Shyam Narayan Jha, Food Standards and Permissible Limits, in 
RAPID DETECTION OF FOOD ADULTERANTS AND CONTAMINANTS: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 63 (Shyam Narayan Jha, ed., 2016) (discussing the permissible limits 
and food standards with health concerns). See, e.g., LAW360, Swiss Miss Hot 
Cocoa Ingredients Not So ‘Simple,’ Buyers Say (Nov. 20, 2019), 
https://www.law360.com/foodbeverage/articles/1221707/swiss-miss-hot-cocoa-
ingredients-not-so-simple-buyers-say?nl_pk=bcb58e84-93b2-4da6-99e5-
a98e96f90cccK (discussing litigation over whether “simple” on Swiss Miss label 
was violated by inclusion of alkalized cocoa). 
135  The costs of complying with food regulation can be extensive—these 
costs are themselves the subject of academic study. E.g., John M. Antle, Benefits 
and Costs of Food Safety Regulation, 24 FOOD POL’Y 605, 609 (1999) (discussing 
academic modeling of the costs involved in complying with food safety 
regulation). 
136  This simplified version of reality also assumes there are, e.g., no threats 
to human health from this standard. The “costs” involved in adverse health events 
could be treated as one more factor over which to bargain with producers. See, 
e.g., id. at 607-08 (discussing models of the perception of risky food). 
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to consumers from the label statement greater than the 
corresponding savings in compliance costs, and a more strict 
standard would similarly add more to compliance costs than to 
increased consumer benefits.137 
Suppose then that either a regulator or series of court 
decisions established a stricter standard, at one part per 
billion.138 A firm viewing this regulation has a series of choices: 
(1) remove the label descriptor, (2) maintain the label descriptor 
and comply with the new standard, or (3) maintain the label 
descriptor, fail to comply with the new quality control standard, 
and risk litigation. For a risk-neutral, rational firm, if the 
revenue from the label descriptor is less than both the costs of 
compliance and the expected value of testing-based lawsuit 
settlements, then the firm will find it rational to remove the 
label descriptor. If the added revenue from the label descriptor 
exceeds that of either compliance or the expected value of 
settlement payouts, then the firm will maintain the label. 
Assuming the firm keeps the label, whether the firm complies or 
risks litigation then depends on the costs of compliance 
compared to the expected value of settlement payouts for 
noncompliance.139 The total expected value of settlement 
 
137  For example, assume consumers have increasing utility with decreasing 
levels of contamination, that is, consumers are happier with lower amounts of 
contamination. While these consumers will always be happier with lower levels 
of contamination, the marginal costs of quality control are increasing with the 
level of quality. That is, it becomes increasingly costly to ensure higher and higher 
levels of quality control, due to the need for increasing amounts of monitoring, 
more precise and expensive testing, and so on. As with standard supply and 
demand models, there will be a point at which the marginal benefit to consumers 
from the additional quality will exceed the costs to producers of providing that 
level of quality assurance. It would be inefficient for society to push quality 
control beyond this level. A more formal framework could, e.g., model consumer 
preferences in greater details, but the general reasoning above motivates the 
theoretical conclusions in this simplified view of the world. See supra note 3 for 
discussion of these applications of the Coase Theorem. 
138  See Jha, supra note 134 (providing an overview and theory of 
establishing label standards). 
139  A risk-neutral firm directly compares the cost of compliance to the 
probability of litigation multiplied by the amount it expects to pay to settle the 
lawsuits. See Joanna M. Shepherd, Ideal Versus Reality in Third-Party Litigation 
Financing, 8 J. L. ECON & POL’Y, 593, 597-98 (2012) (discussing risk-neutral 
firms in litigation). 
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payouts depends on how the firm assesses the probability of 
plaintiffs targeting them with testing lawsuits and the expected 
payouts that would then occur for meritorious claims.140 If the 
firm decided to risk litigation, in a world without transaction 
costs settlements would be negotiated costlessly, without 
holdouts, and the efficient outcome would be reached. The 
producer would compensate consumers the difference between 
the one-part-per-billion legal standard and the ten-parts-per-
billion efficient standard, all while maintaining quality control 
and supply chain monitoring to keep the level of contamination 
at ten parts per billion.141 
Similarly, if the standard created via court decision or 
regulation were higher, say 100 parts per billion, then informed 
consumers would be willing to compensate the producer for 
tighter quality control standards, up until the costs of providing 
a higher quality product exceeded consumers’ willingness to pay 
for it.142 Again, the Coase Theorem suggests that without 
transaction costs the parties will ultimately settle on the 
societally optimal level.143 The power of this theory is to suggest 
 
140  In a fuller sense, the firm would then discount these to the appropriate 
time periods based on when they expected settlements to occur, and then compare 
that value to discounted expected revenues from the label claims. For an 
introduction to discounting, see Vincent M. Jolivet, “Present Value of Future 
Earnings” Revisited, 49 INS. COUNSEL J. 316, 316 (1982). 
141  The producer’s profits increase by saving costs through looser quality 
control standards as it relaxes its procedures. It passes some of the savings on to 
consumers to compensate them for violating the rule. Per the assumptions of the 
exercise and the fundamental reasoning behind the Coase Theorem, at the socially 
efficient level of ten parts per billion the costs to compensate consumers begins 
to exceed the savings, and so the efficient equilibrium level is reached. See supra 
note 133 for history and discussion of the principles of the Coase Theorem. 
142  The consumers extend additional compensation to the company to 
tighten quality control standards up until the benefit from the tightened quality 
control exceeds the amount the company charges for improving its standards. 
Again, per the assumptions behind this exercise, the Coase Theorem suggests the 
costs to producers will begin to exceed the amount consumers are willing to pay 
for enhanced quality at the socially efficient level. See id. 
143  In this simplified analysis, we assume there is no “anti-commons” 
situation in which, e.g., multiple plaintiffs or plaintiffs’ attorneys attempt to 
maximize welfare vis-à-vis each other with complementary rights, as well as 
versus their respective defendants. Such a situation implies inherent 
inefficiencies. Ivan Major, Ronald F. King & Cosmin Gabriel Marian, 
Anticommons, the Coase Theorem and the Problem of Bundling Inefficiency, 10 
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that this efficient outcome would be reached regardless of 
whether the rule was one part per billion or 100 parts per billion. 
In either case, the parties would negotiate costlessly to the 
efficient solution of ten parts per billion in the shadow of the 
legal rule. The difference in outcome is not the ultimate level of 
contamination in the product, but whether producers 
compensate consumers or consumers compensate producers to 
reach the socially efficient level. In other words, the established 
level of legal contamination—the height of the “fence” between 
actionable and non-actionable contamination—fails to matter to 
the level of contamination in the product after negotiation 
between consumers and producers.144 
 
While this clearly describes an unrealistic setting, relaxing 
the assumptions of this model to more closely match the real 
world is useful. First, if we allow transaction costs in litigation, 
the particular standard (one, ten, or 100 parts per billion) ceases 
to be irrelevant. The process of settlement becomes costly, due 
to legal fees, discovery costs, and the price of paying attorneys to 
negotiate. For each defendant, the possibility of being sued by 
many plaintiffs adds hold-out costs to settlements—defendants 
in litigation often wish for universal peace, and plaintiffs 
knowing this have incentive to delay settlement beyond others, 
increasing the value of their individual claim.145  With costly 
 
INT’L J. COMMONS 244, 262 (2016) (“As long as there are multiple owners of 
complementary rights, maximizing against each other as well as against the actor 
who wishes to purchase a portion of that right, outcomes systematically will be 
inefficient.”). 
144  Importantly, in this simplified world the same result would apply 
regardless of the process of creating the rule. Without transaction costs, that is, in 
a model in which litigation and coordination among parties are costless, plaintiffs 
and defendants would reach efficient outcomes whether the standard were created 
through court decision or regulation. The process of rule creation would be 
irrelevant to social efficiency, as the rule itself would not impede costless 
bargaining to efficient outcomes. See Lingwall, supra note 11, at 168 (discussing 
how parties will reach optimal outcomes regardless of the particular legal rule in 
a world of costless bargaining). 
145  See, e.g., D. Bruce Johnsen, A Transaction Cost Assessment of SEC 
Regulation Best Interest, 18 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 695, 701 (2018) (“Transaction 
costs are never zero, and, in any event, they increase with the number, size, and 
complexity of transactions, eventually overwhelming the benefits from 
negotiating further adjustments.”). 
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litigation and coordination, the socially optimal level is not 
guaranteed to be reached if the standard is not set at the 
efficient level at the beginning. If the standard is established at 
less than ten parts per billion, the added costs of finding and 
negotiating with consumers, whether through attorneys in the 
context of litigation or directly through consumer outreach, will 
add to the producer’s quality control costs, so that the point at 
which costs match and then begin to exceed consumers’ 
willingness to pay for extra quality control will remain below the 
socially optimal level. Similarly, if the standard established 
were greater than ten parts per billion, the costs to consumers 
in coordinating responses to the producer’s practice, engaging 
the producer through litigation, and so on, lower the net benefit 
to consumers from the label statements. Consumers’ willingness 
to pay for extra quality control will be lower because of these 
costs, and the ultimate level of contamination will exceed the 
efficient level. With transaction costs, the level of legally 
acceptable contamination or “height of the fence” matters not 
just to establishing winners and losers (whether producers pay 
consumers to reach the efficient level, or vice versa), but also to 
the overall efficiency of the market. The frictions inherent in 
exchange mean that a rule established at other than the socially 
optimal level will give less than optimal results. In sum, in a 
world with transaction costs, the rule will matter.146 
In this relaxed model, creating an efficient legal rule 
creates value, as parties facing a different rule are unlikely to 
bargain in the shadow of the rule to the efficient level. This begs 
two related questions. First, what will be the cost of creating the 
rule, and second, regardless of cost, which rulemaking process is 
most likely to lead to socially optimal rules.147 If the cost of 
 
146  See, e.g., Lingwall, supra note 11, at 169-172. Here, we use the term 
“rule” colloquially as an established legal principle, not necessarily the result of 
notice and comment regulatory rulemaking.  
147  At a theoretical level, this is also an argument for the regulator itself. See 
D. Bruce Johnsen, A Coasean Approach to Cost-Benefit Analysis, 42 HARV. J. L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 489, 494 (2018) (arguing that regulators should simply ask whether 
a proposed regulation lowers transaction costs, and if not, then “the regulation 
should be scrapped absent convincing evidence that its benefits exceed its costs”). 
In the situation of many-on-many litigation over regulatory versus quasi-
regulatory standards, coordinating standards-creation in mass actions is likely an 
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creating an efficient rule exceeds the societal benefit from the 
rule itself, then the rule creation process has thrown the baby 
out with the regulatory bathwater.148 If the cost of creating an 
efficient rule is minor compared to the societal benefit from the 
rule, that is, if rule optimization is more important than the 
transaction costs involved in its creation, then choosing a 
rulemaking entity or procedure that will achieve, near as 
possible, the efficient rule becomes crucial. In the consumer 
goods setting considered here, the billions of potential products 
sold to millions of consumers mean that due to scale, 
inefficiencies in the rule likely outweigh the transaction costs 
inherent in the rule creation process, and so the fundamental 
question is which rulemaking body is most likely to create a rule 
that approaches a societally efficient level. 
 
As discussed above, traditional modeling of this question 
would consider at least two options: courts or agencies.149 While 
parties will favor either courts or agencies as decision makers 
based on over whom they expect to levy the most comparatively 
effective influence, each of these options comes with a complex 
slate of costs and benefits. For example, agencies are subject to 
capture,150 the electorate may be driven by factors other than the 
regulatory issues at hand, such as the social positions of 
candidates, only highly sophisticated parties may be able to 
substantially influence rulemaking, and so on.151 At the same 
time, agency decision making allows the possibility of 
 
area in which “transaction costs [are] so high that market transactions between the 
affected parties are precluded.” Id. at 495. 
148  Cf. Fennell, supra note 133, at 1474 n.11 and accompanying text 
(discussing when a focus on reducing transaction costs entails such costs that they 
“swamp the gain from the newly enabled trades.”). 
149  Third-party certification, pressure from trade groups, and other non-legal 
options could also be considered, but as primary jurisdiction is the main focus of 
the Article we limit this analysis to the creation of enforceable legal standards 
rather than those rules that rely on market forces alone. Third party certification 
of compliance with a label claim could be valuable, but third party certifications 
come with a host of other substantial problems. See, for example, the problems 
with “greenwashing” labels to convey to consumers a message of sustainability. 
See, e.g., William S. Laufer, Social Accountability and Corporate Greenwashing, 
43 J. BUS. ETHICS 253, 255 (2003). 
150  See Shleifer, supra note 4, at 441. 
151  See Coglianese, supra note 24, at 951. 
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nationwide input from multiple parties, filtered through a 
process reflecting, at least partially, the will of voters through 
their elected officials’ regulatory stances. Similarly, standards-
creation by courts results from litigation, which is driven by 
what plaintiffs find worthwhile to sue about, and is unlikely to 
give outcomes reflecting nationwide democratic bargaining by 
producers and consumers. On the other hand, courts may be able 
to resolve disputes much more quickly than a regulatory process 
and may reflect more independent judgment than agency 
decision making, which is inherently tied to political forces, 
despite the science-based mission of agencies.152 
Faced with such a barrage of costs and benefits, theorizing 
whether courts and agencies may create more socially optimal 
rules requires strong assumptions. For example, agency 
expertise in a particular subject matter may mean that agencies 
are better positioned to weigh the costs and benefits of a 
particular rule, and in a model assuming no regulatory capture, 
efficiency could dictate tasking the agency with rule creation. On 
the other hand, if one assumes that independence is the primary 
factor motivating efficient rule creation, then courts less bound 
by political forces are the better regulatory body, despite the 
extra time that may be needed to develop sufficient subject 
matter expertise to create efficient rules.153 The assumptions 
required to solve this debate may vary by the particular issue at 
hand.154 In our setting, the negative effect of ad-hoc local 
 
152  See Winters, supra note 10, at 596. 
153  Cf. Schlag, supra note 12, at 189:  
 
Another of Coase’s arguments . . . is that we do not have (and 
almost never have) the information required to make the 
analysis work. In order to decide whether to adopt a liability or 
a no-liability regime . . . we need to calculate, at the appropriate 
level of generality, all external effects . . . on all the relevant 




154  The need for strong assumptions to resolve the court versus agency 
question is itself an argument for the continued existence of the primary 
jurisdiction doctrine, as primary jurisdiction allows a court to assess the relevant 
costs and then allow the opportunity for agency action on a case-by-case basis. 
The court can weigh the time necessary to educate itself, the potential delay, and 
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litigation on national product markets could weigh in favor of 
agency rulemaking over court-based adjudication. 
More importantly, and regardless of whether one believes 
courts or agencies are generally better adjudicators in the 
quality-control setting, the issues involved in selecting 
efficiency-enhancing adjudicators set up the more pertinent 
problem considered in the next section: technological change has 
the capacity to alter the framework of these calculations. In our 
product testing setting, the ability for plaintiffs’ attorneys to 
easily access sophisticated laboratory testing has altered their 
incentives to bring quality-control based litigation, shifting what 
was formerly a regulatory matter to the court system.155 The 
existence of testing results drives up pre-class certification 
settlement values, which are overwhelmingly distributed as 
attorneys’ fees. In addition to inefficiencies created through 
patchwork adjudication of similar issues among courts and 
defendants, this shifts the potential value created through 
efficient quality-control and labeling standards away from 
consumers and producers to transaction costs in the form of 
attorneys’ fees. Primary jurisdiction stands as one of the few 
ways to shift the benefits of quality-control based labeling 
standards away from transaction costs and back to the 
parties.156 
 
the costs in terms of uniformity if it proceeds. It may conclude that the costs and 
benefits lie in favor of potential agency action. E.g., Tran v. Sioux Honey Ass’n 
Coop., No. 8:17–cv–110–JLS–JCGx, 2017 WL 5587276 at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 
2017) (analyzing the possibility of a primary jurisdiction referral). 
155  Technological-based decreases in costs associated with laboratory 
testing increase the potential gains to plaintiffs attorneys from bringing testing-
based litigation. The incentivizes moving potential quality control violations to 
the court system rather than the regulatory process, which offers a participatory, 
rather than litigation-based, way of creating standards. See, e.g., Farina, supra 
note 23, at 402 (discussing participation in the rulemaking process). 
156  Setting efficient regulatory quality control standards creates social value 
by maximizing the sum of (1) consumer welfare from informative labeling minus 
(2) the costs in quality control to conform to labeling statements. See supra note 
146 and accompanying text. In the absence of an efficient rule, this value is either 
lost due to transactions that do not occur or is converted into transaction costs as 
parties negotiate towards the efficient outcome. See id. In areas without clear 
regulatory standards, enhanced attorneys’ fee awards based on product testing 
thus represent conversion of the potential value from efficient standards into 
attorney paychecks. The incentives created for attorneys to establish quasi-
43
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D.      Increased Scientific Resolving Power and Institutional 
Evolution 
 
The prior section showed that the choice of policymakers in 
a transaction-cost laden world is a significant one, as the choice 
of policymakers matters to both the distributional aspects of 
legal rights and to their overall efficiency. It also showed that 
technological change is central to this debate, as it alters the 
incentives for parties to engage the court system rather than 
traditional regulatory channels. This section applies this 
analysis to the situation of increasing scientific resolving power 
in product testing, its effect on institutions, and the relationship 
between courts and agencies in particular. 
In the setting of our primary example, the amount of 
foreign substance in consumer products was historically difficult 
to measure,157 although records exist of contamination of some 
goods.158 The penalties for food adulteration when it did occur 
 
regulatory standards thus mirrors those encouraging fraud-detection in other 
settings. E.g., Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Enhanced Damges and 
Attorney’s Fees For Willful Patent Infringment, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 291, 315 (2004) 
(“[F]rom the standpoint of optimal deterrence, enhanced damages are 
appropriate . . . when there is a risk of underdetection or underenforcement.”).   
157  In Accum’s lurid 1820 exposé, he suggests detecting “grosser abuses” of 
essential oils by, e.g., testing for the presence of alcohol by adding water and 
observing color changes, testing for the presence of turpentine by dipping the oil 
in to paper, drying and smelling. ACCUM, supra note 50, at 24. He then notes that 
“[t]he more subtle artists, however, have contrived other methods of 
sophistication, which elude all trials . . .. without any possibility of discovering 
the abuse by any of the before-mentioned trials.” Id. at 24–25. As to food, Accum 
believed “[t]he ingenuity and perseverance of self-interest is proof against 
prohibitions, and contrives to elude the vigilance of the most active government.” 
Id. at 42. In the modern world, testing for the presence of food adulteration at 
home is daunting, if not impossible. Some testing can be done, but even that 
generally requires some knowledge of chemistry. See D.P. Attrey, Detection of 
Food Adulterants/Contaminants, in FOOD SAFETY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: A 
PUBLIC HEALTH PERSPECTIVE 129, 139–41 (Rajul Kumar Gupta, Puja Dudeja & 
Amarjeet Singh Minhas, eds., 2017). 
158  See Demetrios G. Sotirchos, Georgios P. Danezis & Contantinos A. 
Georgiou, Introduction, Definitions and Legislation, in FOOD AUTHENTICATION: 
MANGAGEMENT, ANALYSIS, & REGULATION 3, 45 (2017) (noting that since 
antiquity “traders used to adulterate wine, pepper, and balsam, all commodities of 
high added value and price.”) (citing H. RACKHAM, IV PLINY NATURAL HISTORY 
IV LIBRI XII-XVI (1960)). See generally P. Dudeja & A. Singh, Food Safety in 
44https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss2/3
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could be severe, such as being forced to consume the adulterated 
food until death.159 The capacity for fraud or other adulteration 
increased with industrial-level food production, which developed 
on pace with other technology in the industrial revolution.160 For 
example, consider the industrialization of a common food 
product: bread. Industrial-level production of bread began 
around 1810 as various inventions and processes lowered the 
costs involved in bread production. In Austria, a process was 
developed in 1810 to separate bran from wheat as it was 
milled.161 This made producing refined flour less costly.162 A few 
decades later in 1834, the McCormick reaper made it far quicker 
and easier to harvest grain.163 Around the mid-1800s, 
commercial gas ovens were put into use, which stopped bakery 
reliance on chopped wood.164 Steel-rollers were invented in 
Hungary in 1865, which again lowered the cost of milling wheat, 
and in 1868 Fleischmann’s industrialized “compressed yeast” 
took away the need for tending sourdough levains and their 
 
Modern Society—Changing Trends of Food Production and Consumption, in 
FOOD SAFETY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: A PUBLIC HEALTH PERSPECTIVE 83, 85 
(Rajul Kumar Gupta, Puja Dudeja & Amarjeet Singh Minhas, eds., 2017) 
(describing the change from pre-industrialized to post-industrialized food 
processing, characterized by lower nutritive value and greater safety hazards). By 
“food fraud” we mean both intentional activities done to deceive consumers and 
more general contamination regardless of intent. See generally Demetrios G. 
Sotirchos, Georgios P. Danezis & Contantinos A. Georgiou, Introduction, 
Definitions and Legislation, in FOOD AUTHENTICATION: MANAGEMENT, 
ANALYSIS, & REGULATION 3, 4 (2017) (discussing how the food science literature 
classifies food fraud). 
159  Schieber, supra note 53, at 2 (“Punishment . . . was rigorous and cruel. 
In Nuremberg in the 15th century, an adulterator of saffron was burnt over his 
own produce, and others were buried alive or their eyes were gouged out. . .. In 
some cases offenders were forced to consume their adulterated food until they 
died.”). 
160  Id. at 3 (“With the advent of the Industrial Revolution, this issue 
increased dramatically. . .. For example, flour was added to sausages to enhance 
their water binding capacity, colorants were used to improve the overall 
appearance of foods, and milk was diluted with water.”). 
161  NATHAN MYHRVOLD & FRANCISCO MIGOYA, 1 MODERNIST BREAD 86 
(2017). 
162  Id. 
163  Id. 
164  Id. at 87. 
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corresponding lengthy rise times.165 In 1928, Otto Rohwedder’s 
ingenuity made sliced bread possible.166 Chemical means to 
control weeds and pests began to be used around World War II, 
and their use multiplied over following decades.167 In the 1960s, 
the Chorleywood process was invented, in which bakers could 
dramatically speed up bread production “by adding hard fats, 
extra yeast and a number of chemicals and then mixing at high 
speed.”168 As industrial-level processing emerged through heavy 
use of pesticides, industrial-scale processing of ingredients, and 
creative use of food science to manipulate ingredients during 
production, the capacity for food fraud increased.169 
Until 1800 little could be done scientifically to test for the 
presence of contamination.170 The only substantial institutional 
check on food quality remained the market reputation of food 
 
165  Id. 
166  Id. at 88. 
167  MYHRVOLD & FRANCISCO, supra note 161, at 89. See S.P. Singh, S. Kaur 
& D. Singh, Food Toxicology—Past, Present, and the Future (the Indian 
Perspective), in FOOD SAFETY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: A PUBLIC HEALTH 
PERSPECTIVE 91, 95 (Rajul Kumar Gupta, Puja Dudeja & Amarjeet Singh Minhas, 
eds., 2017) (providing an international perspective and noting the:  
 
problem of pesticides in food in India is so widespread that 
many consider it extremely difficult, if not impossible to 
rectify. . .. [D]espite a ban, the toxic pesticides are freely 
available in the market, showing a blatant disregard for public 
safety. . .. [T]he public response to pesticide misuse is dismal 
as no one except a few wishes to come forward and build 
pressue on the government to take remedial actions. 
 
168  BBC, Chorleywood: The Bread that Changed Britain (June 7, 2011), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-13670278. 
169  This is not to say bread was free from adulteration before modern 
methods. Bread could be “plumped up with chalk” before industrialized 
processes. David Edwards, Food Fraud: It’s What’s for Dinner?, SCI. AM. (Aug. 
19, 2014), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/food-fraud-it-s-what-
s-for-dinner/. See Christina Davis, Panera Bread Class Action Challenges 
‘Clean’ Food Marketing, TOPCLASSACTIONS (Apr. 3, 2019), 
https://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/consumer-
products/food/889097-panera-bread-class-action-challenges-clean-food-
marketing/ (discussing a modern allegation). 
170  See Atkins, supra note 50, at 100 (“No reliable tests for the adulteration 
of foods existed until about 1800.”). 
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producers, but as “advances in science made it possible for firms 
to adulterate their goods in ways that were not easily perceived 
by consumers,” reputation alone was now insufficient.171 In 
response, city-level laboratories began to conduct testing in the 
mid-1800s, initially providing help to merchants who suspected 
supplier problems.172 States did not begin to pass legislation to 
regulate “pure food” until the late 1800s, perhaps in response to 
technological change which created substitutes for traditional 
products, such as oleomargarine for butter.173 In the United 
States, the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906 created the FDA. 
This was followed by its more powerful sister, the Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act of 1938. The FDA’s subsequent rulemaking 
under these laws represented something of a culmination of 
federal adulteration efforts, establishing national-level 
standards to police certain aspects of adulteration.174 
Summarizing this history from an institutional 
perspective, reputation effects were initially the main check on 
adulteration as food production systems industrialized.175 As 
food science advanced, reputation effects became insufficient 
because undetectable fraud could not generate negative 
reputation and check producers. This created incentives to 
develop testing technology in response. As it became possible to 
measure and test for subtle adulteration at the city or state level, 
this enabled previously impossible regulatory mechanisms to 
police these standards. The new institutional framework was 
regulation rather than reputation, built on advancing resolving 
 
171  Id. at 104.  
172  Id. 
173  See Marc T. Law, The Origins of Pure Food Regulation, 63 J. ECON. 
HIST. 1103, 1103–1104 (2003) (analyzing historical data on consumption of 
adulterated food and state law passage and finding evidence that pure food laws 
served an informational purpose by informing consumers what they were, in fact, 
purchasing). 
174  Schieber, supra note 53, at 5. See Atkins, supra note 50, at 103 
(discussing how other countries lagged the United States). 
175  See Attrey, supra note 157, at 133–37 (providing an international 
perspective with an extensive list of common food adulterants/contaminants and 
their health effects including, e.g., pesticide residues, asbestos, antibiotics, 
microorganisms, and toxins). In the United States, FDA is joined by other 
regulators with authority over food and pesticides, such as the EPA (regulating 
pesticides) and the USDA (regulating, e.g., inspection of meat processing 
facilities). 
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power in testing. Regulation flowed from this push-pull between 
technological change advancing ways to adulterate food and 
methods to detect adulteration, with the regulatory issue often 
how much adulteration was too much. All food is adulterated at 
some level, and so the institutional view was that reasonable 
standards could not demand Platonic purity from food products. 
In the United States, the FDA eventually adopted an entire slate 
of these food quality standards, along with instructions for how 
those standards would be evaluated by the agency.176 These 
standards were, to some extent, the product of food producer 
input and consumer advocacy.177 
Current standards for natural contamination are outlined 
in the FDA Food Defects Level Handbook.178 For many foods, it 
lists common sources of contamination along with acceptable 
levels of contamination. For frozen berries, the standard is no 
more than an average of four or more insect larvae per 500 
grams.179 For cornmeal, no more than an average of one or more 
whole insects per fifty grams.180 Contamination is specified for, 
e.g., insect parts, parasites, mold, mildew, rodent filth (no more 
than two or more rodent hairs per ten grams crushed oregano!), 
and so on. If a particular food is not described specifically via 
regulation, “FDA’s technical and regulatory experts in filth and 
extraneous materials use a variety of criteria, often in 
combination, in determining the significance and regulatory 
impact of the findings.”181 Contamination by other sources such 
as pesticides are given in 40 CFR § 180, “Tolerances and 
Exemptions for Pesticide Chemical Residues in Food.” This 
contains an enormous list of possible food contaminants, from 
acephate182 to ziram.183 
 
176  See, e.g., FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: FOOD LABELING GUIDE 
(2013) (providing guidance on FDA food labeling policy). 
177  For example, food industry lobbyists were concerned with the burden of 
varied state regulations. See DONNA J. WOOD, STRATEGIC USES OF PUBLIC 
POLICY: BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 144 (1986). 
178  FDA, FOOD DEFECT LEVELS HANDBOOK (2018). 
179  Id. 
180  Id. 
181  Id. 
182  An insecticide tolerated in, e.g., milk at 0.10 ppm. 40 CFR § 180.108. 
183  A fungicide tolerated in, e.g., almonds, up to 0.10 ppm. 40 CFR 
§ 180.116. 
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With standards for many types of adulteration in place at 
the national level, and with threat of regulatory enforcement for 
violation, food producers had incentive to establish quality 
control standards that would generally ensure products within 
regulatory specifications. This did not stop consumer 
preferences moving towards demand for clarity about food 
production.184 For example, pesticide residue was tolerable 
within existing regulations, but consumers with evolving tastes 
began to push for something more.185 In 1990, organic labeling 
standards were established to provide additional bright lines for 
producers and consumers, taking the place of scattered 
marketing and state regulation.186 Even then, demand for higher 
quality, or in some sense, simpler food persisted.187 Organic 
standards allowed a host of somewhat unnatural substances in 
food, and producers saw the ability to signal wholesomeness and 
simplicity without the need to qualify as organic. The result was 
a host of labeling terms such as “natural,” “real,” and “simple,” 
each attempting to convey the idea of sidestepping the 
industrialized food chain and avoiding artificial substances. 
New label claims outside FDA regulations were blood in 
the water to plaintiff attorneys. Litigation over these claims 
flourished, hitting the “sweet spot” of labeling that seemed to 
convey material facts about the food yet were not subject to 
preemption defenses. These litigations centered around what 
reasonable consumers might make of label claims, and 
enterprising attorneys began to take advantage of relatively 
 
184  See generally Sotirchos, Danezis & Georgiou, supra note 158 (“In recent 
days, especially in more economically developed countries . . . consumers have 
demanded to know without any doubt the origin and content of the food and 
whether it is safe to eat; in certain cases, consumers are willing to pay more for 
specific quality attributes.”) (citing Cuputo M. Aprile & R.M. Nayga, Jr., 
Consumers’ Valuation of Food Quality Labels: The Case of the European 
Geographic Indication and Organic Farming Labels, 36 INT’L J. CONSUMER 
STUDIES 158 (2012)). 
185  See Ariele Lessing, A Supplemental Labeling Regime for Organic 
Products: How the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Hampers a Market Solution to 
an Organic Transparency Problem, 18 MO. ENVT’L. L. & POL’Y REV. 415, 415–
31 (2011) (discussing the history of organic regulation). 
186  Id. 
187  See, e.g., MICHAEL POLLAN, IN DEFENSE OF FOOD: AN EATER’S 
MANIFESTO (2009) (developing, for example, his famous saying “Eat food. Not 
too much. Mostly plants.”). 
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costless ways to drive up settlement values: come to the 
litigation armed with independent testing results which showed 
potential violation of label claims. What would have been a 
message from a regulator was now the subject of a complaint: 
technological advances in the ability to measure for incredibly 
subtle adulteration challenged the existing institutional 
framework. In the absence of regulation for these new terms, 
reputational effects had again become a central institutional 
check on producers—in substance consumers relying on trusted 
“natural” brands, and so on, but were now becoming subject to 
measurement, and hence litigation.188 
Institutionally, as the gap between what was permissible 
via regulation and what consumers began to expect from food 
widened, plaintiff attorneys began to act as an informal 
regulatory body, sending products to laboratories for testing and 
using litigation, rather than regulation, as a policing 
mechanism.189 In the agency-based regulatory process, 
 
188  In a sense, plaintiff attorneys utilizing testing results in pleadings were 
exposing a potential lemons problem created by this new wave of food labeling. 
Producers knew much more about the contents of food, including the remnants 
from pesticide use and production aids, that under existing regulations need not 
be listed as ingredients or disclosed on labels. Modern consumers, just as those in 
the 1800’s confronting industrial-level food fraud for the first time, could not 
reasonably be expected to possess this level of information. The resulting 
informational asymmetries between buyer and seller gave incentive for sellers to 
pass off lower-quality products as higher quality or at least keep silent about low-
level adulteration in “natural” or similarly-labeled foods. Unlike a market for 
lemons in cars, however, before the advent of litigation-based product testing that 
revealed the possibility of contamination, most consumers would remain unaware 
and continue to rely on reputational effects to trust the quality of the item. 
189  We use the term “quasi-regulatory” in the sense of (1) pushing a 
traditional regulatory agenda, with (2) traditional regulatory mechanisms such as 
statistical testing, that (3) imposes traditional regulatory burdens such as quality 
control standards, that (4) are established through litigation. The food quality 
literature assumes that product testing is embedded in a regulatory framework, not 
in plaintiff-pushed patchworks. See Sotirchos et al., supra note 158, at 3:  
 
The proper description of food . . . and its ingredients is 
enforced by labeling regulation which aims to reassure the 
consumer by giving them all the available information needed 
by issuing guidelines . . .. In order to enforce this legislation, 
state inspection bodies use various scientific methods to certify 
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producers would have the ability to weigh in on proposed rules 
through lobbying and participation in notice and comment 
rulemaking.190 Absent these processes, producers facing the 
burdens of quasi-regulatory, litigation-enforced quality control 
without the corresponding benefits of the regulatory process 
have responded by trying to reshape the litigation towards 
regulation. In this way, the rational response to plaintiff 
attorneys stepping into the shoes of regulators is to move the 
court to treat the litigation like regulation, moving decision 
making back to regulatory bodies. The primary vehicle to shift 
adjudication back to the jurisdiction of the regulators is thus 
aptly named: primary jurisdiction.191 
The two main justifications for primary jurisdiction: 
expertise, justifying specific primary jurisdiction in our 
terminology, or uniformity, justifying general primary 
jurisdiction, flow naturally from this reasoning.192 The 
possibility of engaging regulatory agencies staffed by subject-
matter experts through an application of specific primary 
jurisdiction may be attractive to defendants concerned with 
 




190  The tendency to view courts as a kind of uber-decision maker is not the 
province of administrative law alone. It extends to constitutional analysis broadly. 
See Leah Litman, The Guns Case is About Much More than Guns, THE ATLANTIC 
(Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/12/new-york-
state-rifle-pistol-court/602725/ :  
 
In making the argument that their case still be heard, the 
plaintiffs reveal a worrisome, implicit belief: The courts are the 
only forum for remedying or stopping unconstitutional conduct. 
This is not—nor should it be—the case. The political branches 
(including state legislatures and state executives) can remedy 
unconstitutional conduct as well; they may even be preferable 
to courts, given that they are democratically elected and 
accountable to the people—something the Constitution values. 
 
191  This is, of course, not the etymology of the term. “Primary” in “primary 
jurisdiction” conveys the idea of a regulator being more fundamental or vital to 
the resolution of a particular issue. See Babbin, supra note 102, at 1616–17 
(discussing the etymology of “primary jurisdiction”). 
192  Stanley & Coursey, supra note 119. 
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judge or jury misinterpreting or over-weighting the defendant’s 
testing results. Similarly, the potential to influence and create 
national-level product liability standards may be attractive to 
defendants tired of facing repeated lawsuits in one-off class 
actions surrounding label standards around the nation. In each 
case, applying either specific or primary jurisdiction has the 
potential to extend regulatory benefits and safeguards to 
defendants. 
If primary jurisdiction is restricted to its origins in rate 
setting or similar frameworks, this counterbalancing of the 
emergence of a quasi-regulatory state cannot occur. This 
restriction would limit institutional evolution in response to 
technological change, in effect formalizing plaintiff-based 
product testing as an essentially regulatory mechanism. Making 
permanent this subsidy to the bar would shift the value created 
through regulatory standards from consumers towards 
transaction costs.    
 
E. Primary Jurisdiction as Transaction Cost 
 
This final subsection examines a potential response to our 
argument. The prior subsection argued that in the face of 
plaintiff-based product testing, primary jurisdiction serves as an 
avenue to stop conversion of regulatory value into transaction 
costs. Yet, invoking primary jurisdiction itself is a costly 
litigation strategy. Attorneys’ fees are generated litigating 
primary jurisdiction motions, courts must give time to analyzing 
them, and if granted, litigation may be delayed, itself a form of 
transaction cost as parties remain with undecided disputes. 
While these are valid concerns, the nature of quality-control 
litigation weighs in favor of allowing referrals. 
When litigation is delayed for a specific primary 
jurisdiction referral, an efficient court is acknowledging that 
either the time needed to develop expertise to adjudicate in a 
specific field would cause delay in and of itself, or the benefits 
from a more efficient agency-created rule outweigh the costs of 
delay.193 Whether the delay is awaiting agency action, or for the 
 
193  See California v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 30-2014-00725287-CU-BT-
CXC (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2015): 
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court to develop sufficient mastery of a technical area to 
adjudicate, delay results. In other words, delay is a symptom of 
complex litigation, not the primary jurisdiction process alone.194 
When expertise to adjudicate would require extraordinary effort 
by a court to develop, leaving adjudication to those already 
versed in the relative expertise by invoking specific primary 
jurisdiction may be efficiency-enhancing and delay reducing in 
the long run. Even if an agency takes more time to establish 
standards, delay in resolving an individual case is likely 
outweighed by the probability an agency will consider the issue, 
take public input, and reach a more efficient nationwide rule. 
As far as primary jurisdiction “shortcuts” Congressional intent 
and violates federalism in establishing a dual regulatory 
regime,195 a court allowing a specific primary jurisdiction 
referral again recognizes that a dual regulatory scheme is 
excessively costly in those circumstances.196 The factual issues 
 
[T]his case is about determining what the public and doctors 
need to be told about opioids. That determination . . . entails 
much more than determining issues of false and misleading 
marketing. Underlying every issue here, this case requires this 
court to become an expert in the field in which it has no 
expertise. It will have to determine which study, trial, etc. is 
appropriate and correct as to each issue concerning the use of 
opioids, and to what extent.  
 
If the litigation involves a pressing need for human life or health, delay is a more 
significant issue, but both courts and agencies can move quickly when these issues 
are at stake. Courts could also issue temporary injunctions to halt immediate risk 
of harm while then allowing agency action.  
194  But see Occidental Chem. Corp. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 810 F.3d 
299, 309–10 (5th Cir. 2016) (characterizing primary jurisdiction as causing 
“certainty of delay”). 
195  See Cunningham, supra note 10, at 44. 
196  Additionally, the argument that primary jurisdiction violates principles 
of a dual regulatory scheme are difficult to reconcile with Congress creating many 
dual-regulatory schemes after primary jurisdiction was established as a legal 
doctrine, meaning Congress acted knowing the possibility of primary jurisdiction 
based dialogues between courts and agencies existed. For example, the FDCA, 
which creates a dual regulatory system for food labeling, was passed in 1938, 
years after the primary jurisdiction doctrine had been created and elaborated on 
by the Supreme Court. Whether Congress anticipated the doctrine being invoked 
in new areas is questionable, but the doctrine had been well established before 
much of the modern regulatory state emerged. See generally Gregory Ablavsky, 
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in some regulatory areas are more intricate than others—a court 
may be an efficient adjudicator of a simple dispute as part of a 
dual regulatory scheme but find itself lacking in a complex 
one.197 Similarly, an efficient court allowing a general primary 
jurisdiction referral does so because the costs involved in non-
uniformity exceed the benefits from dual regulation. In the 
context of mass actions, which often involve many potentially 
injured parties affected by nationwide products or policies, this 
is likely the case. 
In this context, preserving the primary jurisdiction 
doctrine may also be efficiency enhancing generally in the same 
manner as class actions versus individual actions. Just as class 
actions coordinate and create efficiencies in many-on-one 
litigation for small claims, primary jurisdiction may coordinate 
and create efficiencies in many-on-many litigation settings for 
small claims. For instance, this might occur when multiple class 
actions are filed against many defendants, all hinging on a 
central factual theme or question.198 Class actions in the context 
of small claims offer at least three advantages over traditional 
litigation: collective action enables litigation that could not occur 
severally due to direct transaction costs, such as the cost of legal 
 
Empire States: The Coming of Dual Federalism, 128 YALE L.J. 1792, 1800 (2018) 
(noting that modern conceptions of constitutional federalism are quite different 
from its original construction, as establishing a dual-sovereign governance system 
which strengthened states against competing claims from, e.g., corporations and 
separatists). 
197  That is not to say all food labeling disputes are simple, as food labeling 
law may often involve statistical issues (such as in a dispute of nutritional claims) 
and economic expertise (such as when establishing a price premium to calculate 
damages). E.g., In Re ConAgra Foods, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d 919, 944-47 (C.D. 
Cal. 2015) (discussing hedonic regression and statistical techniques to establish a 
price premium in “all natural” litigation). 
198  Class actions themselves may be coordinated, such as pre-trial MDLs 
formed from multiple state class actions. “Natural” class actions in particular have 
been the subject of multiple law review articles. E.g., Sarah Valenzuela, Tracing 
the Evolution of Food Fraud Litigation: Adopting an Ascertainability Standard 
that is “Natural”, 34 REV. LITIG. 609 (2015); Shea Thompson, Artificially 
“Natural”: Class Action Lawsuits Attack Misleading “Natural” Claims in FDA’s 
Absence, 47 IND. L. REV. 893 (2014); Nicole E. Negowetti, Defining Natural 
Foods: The Search for a Natural Law, 26 REGENT U. L. REV. 329 (2013); Nicole 
E. Negowetti, A National “Natural” Standard for Food Labeling, 65 ME. L. REV. 
581 (2012). 
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services versus small harms, the class action device solves 
barriers against collective action such as free-riders and the 
externalities created by early litigants exhausting defendants’ 
resources, and class actions generate positive externalities 
outside the litigation itself.199 
Through a primary jurisdiction referral, the agency-based 
regulatory process becomes a similar way for multiple 
stakeholders on both sides of the v. to combine input on a dispute 
“mediated” by the agency through a regulatory, non-litigation 
process. This enables collective national action which has not 
occurred due to the transaction costs involved in many-on-many 
decision-making, particularly between state-level actors, and 
generates positive externalities in areas beyond the series of 
litigations at hand. For example, should the FDA engage 
rulemaking surrounding the term “natural” as to trace pesticide 
contamination, the hundreds of parties in uncoordinated 
litigation over the term would have a collective forum to weigh 
in on the term with binding results as the agency acts, 
something that has not occurred through costly, competing court 
decisions. 
In sum, the benefits of maintaining primary jurisdiction as 
a possibility for producers in product testing claims likely 
outweigh the costs inherent in its invocation. This holds for both 
the transaction-cost analysis behind specific and general 
primary jurisdiction and the analysis of the nature of efficiencies 
in collective action for small harms. 
 
V.     Conclusion 
We began with a quote from Robert Frost’s Mending Wall, 
noting that legal realism does not “love a wall” imposed between 
courts and agencies. In contrast to many academic models which 
assume separation between these bodies, primary jurisdiction 
has traditionally been a prominent way for these to interface. In 
 
199  See William B. Rubenstein, Why Enable Litigation? A Positive 
Externalities Theory of the Small Claims Class Action, 74 UMKC L. REV. 709, 
710–11, 725-27 (2006) (identifying “decree effects” and “settlement effects” 
which like stare decisis make later litigation more efficient by adding information 
on the value of legal claims to the marketplace, “threat effects” as the class action 
deters future bad behavior by potential defendants, and “structural effects” of 
decreasing the need to rely on public enforcement of existing law).  
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this Article, we argue that technological change drives litigation 
strategies in ways that justify keeping open this channel for 
agency referrals, rather than limiting the doctrine to its origins 
in specific settings. In Frost’s poem, the farmer continues by 
noting “Before I built a wall I’d ask to know // What I was walling 
in or walling out.”200 Limiting the primary jurisdiction doctrine 
to its original context risks walling product-testing based claims 
out of agencies, preserving the creation of quasi-regulatory, 
statistical-based quality control regimes by plaintiffs’ attorneys. 
Courts and agency regulators in this context need the ability to 
integrate, allowing defendants the potential to move these 
actions to a regulatory space designed for national-level 
deliberating. 
In this statistical quality-control framework, primary 
jurisdiction allows courts the crucial flexibility of examining 
testing-based cases, weighing the transaction costs—whether in 
the court developing expertise or the costs stopping collective 
action across jurisdictions—and judging when an agency, rather 
than the court, might be a better adjudicator. Invoking specific 
primary jurisdiction may let agencies construct more optimal 
rules due to prior expertise in technical matters that are often 
at issue. Similarly, for product-testing based claims with 
inherently multi-state implications, invoking general primary 
jurisdiction moves the creation of national-level standards away 
from courts to a body designed for that purpose. Both these 
prevent plaintiff attorneys from capturing the societal benefits 
from regulation by establishing themselves as a quasi-
regulatory body enforcing label claims through independent 
testing. In this way, as scientific resolving power and the scope 
of potentially measurable harm continue to evolve, primary 
jurisdiction serves as a much-needed mechanism allowing 
corresponding evolution in adjudication. 
 
 
200  FROST, supra note 2 at 34.   
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